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THE POSET OF ALL LOGICS II:
LEIBNIZ CLASSES AND HIERARCHY
R. JANSANA AND T. MORASCHINI
Abstract. A Leibniz class is a class of logics closed under the formation of term-
equivalent logics, compatible expansions, and non-indexed products of sets of logics.
We study the complete lattice of all Leibniz classes, called the Leibniz hierarchy. In partic-
ular, it is proved that the classes of truth-equational and assertional logics are meet-prime
in the Leibniz hierarchy, while the classes of protoalgebraic and equivalential logics are
meet-reducible. However, the last two classes are shown to be determined by Leibniz
conditions consisting of meet-prime logics only.
1. Introduction
When ordered under intepretability [24], the class of (propositional) logics forms
a preorder. Its associated partial order Log, called the poset of all logics, consists of
equivalence classes of equi-interpretable logics. Building on this formalism, in this paper
we introduce and study the notion of a Leibniz class of logics.
From an order-theoretic point of view, Leibniz classes are classes of logics that can be
faithfully identified with the upsets of Log that are closed under infima of arbitrarily large
sets. Equivalently, they can be characterized in terms of closure properties as the classes
of logics closed under the formation of term-equivalent logics, compatible expansions,
and non-indexed products of sets of logics (see [24] for the relevant definitions).
Part of the interest of Leibniz classes lies in the fact that they allow to clarify the yet
informal concept of the Leibniz hierarchy, i.e. a taxonomy in which logics are classified in
terms of syntactic principles (up to now recognized on empirical grounds) corresponding
to the behaviour of the so-called Leibniz operator [12, 18, 20, 19]. More precisely, the road
we take is to identify the Leibniz hierarchy with the complete lattice of Leibniz classes
ordered under inclusion. Remarkably, this abstraction preserves the fact that Leibniz
classes are collections of logics globally satisfying some syntactic principles, here called
Leibniz conditions, consisting of special sequences of logics indexed by all ordinals.
One of the main advantages of this point of view is that it allowed to unify in [25] the
theory of the Leibniz hierarchy with that of the Maltsev hierarchy of universal algebra, i.e.
a taxonomy in which varieties are classified by means of syntactic principles related to
the structure of congruence lattices [22, 26, 28, 30, 35, 36, 38].
In this paper we restrict our attention to the study of Leibniz classes. First we show that
the majority of classes of logics traditionally associated with the Leibniz hierarchy happen
to be Leibniz classes. Among them we count the classes of protoalgebraic, equivalential,
and assertional logics, whose respective Leibniz conditions are also found (Theorems 3.4,
3.7, and 3.11). Then we begin an order-theoretic investigation of the Leibniz hierarchy,
understood as the complete lattice of all Leibniz classes. More precisely, we focus on
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the problem of determining whether the most prominent Leibniz classes are meet-prime
or meet-irreducible elements of the Leibniz hierarchy. Affirmative answers to these
questions can then be interpreted as stating that the Leibniz classes under consideration
capture primitive or fundamental concepts. Similar problems were studied in the setting
of the Maltsev hierarchy for instance in [21] (see also [2, 29, 37]).
Some of our results can be summarized as follows. On the one hand the Leibniz
classes of truth-equational and assertional logics are shown to be meet-prime (Theorems
5.10 and 5.11). On the other hand, it is proved that the classes of protoalgebraic and
equivalential logics are meet-reducible (Theorems 6.7 and 6.7). This negative result is
compensated by the observation that the Leibniz condition determining the class of
protoalgebraic (resp. equivalential) logics consists of logics whose equivalence classes are
meet-prime in the poset Log (Theorems 7.2 and 7.5).
2. Leibniz conditions
We use the same notation as in [24]. Recall that OR is the class of ordinals.
Definition 2.1. A strong Leibniz condition Φ is simply a logic `Φ. A logic ` is said to
satisfy Φ if `Φ 6 `, and the class of logics satisfying Φ is denoted by Log(Φ). Similarly,
a Leibniz condition Φ is a class {Φα : α ∈ OR} of strong Leibniz conditions such that if
α 6 β, then `Φβ6 `Φα . A logic ` is said to satisfy Φ if `Φα 6 ` for some α ∈ OR, and the
class of logics satisfying Φ is denoted by Log(Φ).
Accordingly, a class K of logics is a (resp. strong) Leibniz class if it is of the form Log(Φ)
for some (resp. strong) Leibniz condition Φ. 
Recall that Log is a set-complete meet-semilattice [24, Thm. 4.6]. A subcollection
F ⊆ Log is a set-complete filter if it is a non-empty upset closed under infima of sets.
Similarly, F ⊆ Log is a principal filter if it is a principal upset of Log. Finally, given a class
K of logics, we set
K† := {J`K : ` ∈ K}.
The following result is instrumental to construct concrete Leibniz classes.
Theorem 2.2. Let K be a class of logics. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) K is a Leibniz class.
(ii) K is closed under term-equivalence, compatible expansions, and non-indexed products of
sets of logics.
(iii) The collection K† is a set-complete filter of Log, and K = {` : J`K ∈ K†}.
Proof. We rely on the observation that, given a family {`i : i ∈ I} of logics, the infimum
of {J`iK : i ∈ I} in Log is J⊗i∈I `iK [24, Thm. 4.6].
(i)⇒(iii): Suppose that K is a Leibniz class, i.e. that there is a Leibniz condition
Φ = {Φα : α ∈ OR} such that K = Log(Φ). We begin by proving that the collection K† is
a set-complete filter of Log.
It is clear that K† is a non-empty upset of Log. Then consider a set of logics {`i : i ∈
I} ⊆ K. Since K = Log(Φ), for every i ∈ I there exists an ordinal αi such that
`Φαi 6 `i. Let β be the supremum of {αi : i ∈ I}. Since Φ is a Leibniz condition, we have`Φβ 6 `Φαi 6 `i for every i ∈ I. Hence we obtain `Φβ 6
⊗
i∈I `i which, together with
K = Log(Φ), implies that
⊗
i∈I `i ∈ K. Since J⊗i∈I `iK is the infimum of {J`iK : i ∈ I}
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in Log, we conclude that K† is closed under infima of sets. This establishes that K† is a
set-complete filter of Log.
Now, from the definition of K† it follows that K ⊆ {` : J`K ∈ K†}. To prove the other
inclusion, consider a logic ` such that J`K ∈ K†. By the definition of K†, there is a logic
`′ ∈ K such that `′ 6 `. Since `′ ∈ K, there is an ordinal α such that `Φα 6 `′ 6 `.
Since K = Log(Φ), this implies that ` ∈ K as desired.
(iii)⇒(ii): Suppose that ` ∈ K, and consider a logic `′ that is either term-equivalent to
` or a compatible expansion of `. By [24, Prop. 3.8] we have that ` 6 `′ and, therefore,J`K 6 J`′K. Since K† is an upset of Log and J`K ∈ K†, we obtain that J`′K ∈ K†. Together
with the fact that K = {`′′ : J`′′K ∈ K†}, this yields `′ ∈ K. Hence we conclude that K is
closed under term-equivalence and compatible expansions.
Then consider a family {`i : i ∈ I} ⊆ K. By assumption the infimum of {J`iK : i ∈ I} in
Log belongs to K†. This amounts to the fact that J⊗i∈I `iK ∈ K†. As K = {` : J`K ∈ K†},
we conclude that
⊗
i∈I `i ∈ K.
(ii)⇒(i): Consider the cumulative hierarchy {Vα : α ∈ OR} of set theory. For every
ordinal α we set
Kα := K∩Vα and `α:=
⊗
Kα.
Note that if Kα = ∅, then `α is the inconsistent logic in the empty language over ω
variables. Also note that if α 6 β, then Kα ⊆ Kβ and, therefore, `β 6 `α. In particular,
this implies that the following is a Leibniz condition:
Φ := {`α : α ∈ OR}.
To conclude the proof, it suffices to show that Log(Φ) = K. To prove the right-to-left
inclusion, consider a logic ` ∈ K. Since ` is a set, there is an ordinal α such that
` ∈ Vα. This implies that ` ∈ Kα and, therefore, that `α 6 `. Hence we conclude that
` ∈ Log(Φ).
To prove the other inclusion, consider ` ∈ Log(Φ). There exists an ordinal α such
that `α 6 `. By [24, Prop. 3.8] this implies that ` is term-equivalent to a compatible
expansion of
⊗
Kα. As Kα ⊆ K and K is closed under non-indexed products of sets of
logics, compatible expansions, and term-equivalence, this implies ` ∈ K. 
Corollary 2.3. A class K of logics is a strong Leibniz class if and only if K† is a principal filter
of Log, and K = {` : J`K ∈ K†}.
Proof sketch. The proof of the “only if” part is an easier variant of the one of part (i)⇒(iii)
of Theorem 2.2. Then we sketch the “if” part only. By the assumption we know that K† is
the upset generated by J`K, for some logic ` ∈ K. Let Φ be the strong Leibniz condition
determined by `. It is not hard to see that Log(Φ) = K and, therefore, that K is a strong
Leibniz class. 
Remark 2.4. Typical applications of Theorem 2.2 comprise proofs that certain collections
of logics are Leibniz classes. For instance, in [24, Props. 3.8 and 6.1] it was shown that
the class of equivalential logics is closed under term-equivalence, compatible expansions,
and non-indexed products of sets of logics. By Theorem 2.2(ii) we conclude that it is a
Leibniz class. 
Remark 2.5. From Theorem 2.2(ii) it follows that Leibniz classes are closed under the
formation of extensions of logics, as these are special cases of compatible expansions. 
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In this paper we identify the intuitive concept of the Leibniz hierarchy with the poset of
all Leibniz classes ordered under the inclusion relation.
Proposition 2.6. The Leibniz hierarchy is a complete lattice in which infima are intersections
and and suprema are obtained as follows for every collection {Ki : i ∈ I} of Leibniz classes, where
I can be a proper class:∨
i∈I
Ki = {` : ` is a logic and
⊗
j∈J
`j 6 ` for some subset {`j : j ∈ J} ⊆
⋃
i∈I
Ki}.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 2.2. 
Remark 2.7. The statement of Proposition 2.6 presupposes the we can meaningfully speak
of very large intersections and unions of classes (of logics), as the collection {Ki : i ∈ I}
is in general a collection of classes. However, for our purposes this problem is immaterial
as we will only work with finite joins and meets of Leibniz classes. 
3. Examples of Leibniz classes
In this section we show that a range of classes of logics, traditionally associated with
the yet informal concept of the Leibniz hierarchy in abstract algebraic logic, are indeed
Leibniz classes.
A logic ` is said to be protoalgebraic [7, 12] if there is a non-empty set1 ∆(x, y,~z) of
formulas such that for every 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod(`) and a, b ∈ A,
〈a, b〉 ∈ ΩAF ⇐⇒ ∆A(a, b,~c) ⊆ F, for every ~c ∈ A.
In this case, we say that ∆(x, y,~z) is a set of congruence formulas with parameters for `.
Theorem 3.1. Let ` be a logic. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) ` is protoalgebraic.
(ii) ` has theorems and Mod≡(`) = R(Mod(`)).
(iii) There is a non-empty set of formulas ∇(x, y) such that
∅ ` ∇(x, x) x,∇(x, y) ` y.
In this case, the following is a set congruence formulas with parameters for `:
∇ˆ(x, y,~z) := {ϕ(ψ(x,~z),ψ(y,~z)) : ϕ(x, y) ∈ ∇ and ψ(x,~z) ∈ FmL`(ω)}.
Proof. For the equivalence between (i), (ii), and (iii), see [18, Thms. 6.7, 6.17, and 6.57].
The fact that ∇ˆ is a set of equivalence formulas with parameters for ` follows from [9,
Thm. 13.5] (see also [16, Prop. 3.2]). 
Our aim is to prove that protoalgebraic logics form a Leibniz class. To this end, it is
convenient to introduce the following concept:
Definition 3.2. Given an infinite cardinal κ, let L κP be the language consisting of the
binary symbols {(α : α < κ} and the n-ary symbols {∗nα : α < κ} for 0 < n ∈ ω. We set
∇κ(x, y) := {x(α y : α < κ}.
1In the literature the set ∆ is not required to be non-empty. However, this restriction is almost immaterial
as, in a fixed language, there is a unique protoalgebraic logic with an empty ∆, namely the almost inconsistent
logic [18, Prop. 6.11.5].
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The basic protoalgebraic logic of rank κ is the logic `κP formulated on FmL κP (ω) determined
by the rules
∅∇κ(x, x) x,∇κ(x, y) y. 
The following result explains the role of `κP.
Proposition 3.3. Let ` be a logic.
(i) ` is protoalgebraic if and only if `κP 6 ` for every (equiv. some) infinite cardinal κ > |L`|.
(ii) If κ is an infinite cardinal and `κP 6 `, then ` is protoalgebraic.
Proof. (ii): Let τ be an interpretation of `κP into `. From [24, Prop. 3.3] we obtain
∅ ` τ[∇κ(x, x)] and x, τ[∇κ(x, y)] ` y. Then the set τ[∇κ(x, y)] witnesses the validity of
condition (iii) of Theorem 3.1, whence ` is protoalgebraic.
(i): As a special instance of (ii) we obtain that if `κP 6 ` for some infinite cardinal
κ > |L`|, then ` is protoalgebraic. Then suppose that ` is protoalgebraic, and consider
any infinite cardinal κ > |L`|. By Theorem 3.1 there is a set of formulas ∇(x, y) ⊆ Fm(`)
such that
∅ ` ∇(x, x) and x,∇(x, y) ` y. (1)
Now, observe that |∇| 6 max{ω, |L`|} 6 κ. Since ∇ 6= ∅, there is a surjective map
f : {(α : α < κ} → ∇(x1, x2).
Similarly, since |FmL`(ω)| 6 max{ω, |L`|} 6 κ, for every 0 < n ∈ ω there is a surjective
map
gn : {∗nα : α < κ} → {ϕ ∈ FmL`(ω) : ϕ = ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)}.
Observe that the maps f and {gn : 0 < n ∈ ω} can be turned in the natural way into a
single translation τ of L κP into L`.
Recall by Theorem 3.1 that ∇ˆκ and ∇ˆ are sets of congruence formulas with parameters
for `κP and ` respectively. We claim that
∇ˆ(x, y,~z) = τ[∇ˆκ(x, y,~z)]. (2)
We begin by proving the inclusion from left to right. Consider ϕ ∈ ∇ˆ. There are
ψ(x, y) ∈ ∇(x, y) and γ(x, z1, . . . , zn−1) ∈ FmL`(ω) such that
ϕ = ψ(γ(x, z1, . . . , zn−1),γ(y, z1, . . . , zn−1)).
Since f and gn are surjective, there are α, β < κ such that τ((α) = ψ(x1, x2) and
τ(∗nβ) = γ(x1, . . . , xn). Clearly,
ϕ = τ(∗nβ(x, z1, . . . , zn−1)(α ∗nβ(y, z1, . . . , zn−1)).
Moreover, the definition of ∇ˆκ guarantees
∗nβ(x, z1, . . . , zn−1)(α ∗nβ(y, z1, . . . , zn−1) ∈ ∇ˆκ.
Hence we conclude that ϕ ∈ τ[∇ˆκ]. This establishes the inclusion from left to right in (2).
To prove the other inclusion, consider ϕ ∈ τ[∇ˆκ]. Then there are are α < κ and
γ(x,~z) ∈ Fm(`κP) such that ϕ = τ(γ(x,~z)(α γ(y,~z)). Set
γ′(x,~z) := τ(γ(x,~z)) and ψ(x, y) := τ(x(α y).
From the definition of ∇ˆ and the fact that f ((α) ∈ ∇(x1, x2), it follows
ϕ = τ(γ(x,~z)(α γ(y,~z)) = ψ(γ′(x,~z),γ′(y,~z)) ∈ ∇ˆ.
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This establishes the equality in (2).
To conclude the proof, it suffices to show that τ is an interpretation of `κP into `. To this
end, consider a matrix 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`). We begin by showing that 〈Aτ , F〉 is a model
of `κP. Observe that ∇(x, y) = τ[∇κ(x, y)]. Together with (1) and 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod(`), this
yields that the matrix 〈A, F〉 is a model of the rules ∅ τ[∇κ(x, x)] and x, τ[∇κ(x, y)] y.
As a consequence, 〈Aτ , F〉 is a model of the rules ∅∇κ(x, x) and x,∇κ(x, y) y, whence
it is a model of `κP.
Now, for every a, b ∈ A,
a = b⇐⇒ 〈a, b〉 ∈ ΩAF
⇐⇒ ∇ˆA(a, b,~c) ⊆ F for every ~c ∈ A
⇐⇒ τ[∇ˆκ]A(a, b,~c) ⊆ F for every ~c ∈ A
⇐⇒ ∇ˆAτκ (a, b,~c) ⊆ F for every ~c ∈ A
⇐⇒ 〈a, b〉 ∈ ΩAτ F.
The above equivalences are justified as follows: the first is a consequence of the fact
that 〈A, F〉 is reduced by Theorem 3.1(ii), the second follows from the fact that 〈A, F〉 ∈
Mod(`) and that ∇ˆ is a set of congruence formulas with parameters for `, the third
from (2), the fourth is straightforward, and the fifth from the fact that 〈Aτ , F〉 ∈ Mod(`κP)
and that ∇ˆκ is a set of congruence formulas with parameters for `κP. The above display
implies that the congruence ΩA
τ
F is the identity relation. As a consequence, we obtain
〈A, F〉 ∈ R(Mod(`κP)) = Mod≡(`κP). This establishes that τ is an interpretation of `κP
into `, as desired. 
For every ordinal α, let `αP be the logic `ω+|α|P .
Theorem 3.4. The sequence Φ = {`αP : α ∈ OR} is a Leibniz condition and Log(Φ) coincides
with the class of protoalgebraic logics. In particular, protoalgebraic logics form a Leibniz class.
Proof. To prove that Φ is a Leibniz condition, consider α, β ∈ OR such that α 6 β. The
logic `αP is protoalgebraic by Proposition 3.6(ii). This fact and
|Lα| = ω+ |α| 6 ω+ |β|
allow us to apply Proposition 3.6(i), obtaining `βP 6 `αP. Hence we conclude that Φ is a
Leibniz condition. Finally, the fact that Log(Φ) is the class of protoalgebraic logics is a
direct consequence of Proposition 3.6. 
By Remark 2.4 we know that the collection Equiv of equivalential logics is a Leibniz
class. It is therefore sensible to wonder whether we can find an intelligible Leibniz
condition Φ such that Equiv = Log(Φ). This can be done with a simple adaptation of the
method employed in the case of protoalgebraic logics.
Definition 3.5. Given an infinite cardinal κ, let L κE be the language consisting of the
binary symbols {(α : α < κ}. We set
∆κ(x, y) := {x(α y : α < κ}.
The basic equivalential logic of rank κ is the logic `κE formulated on FmL κE (ω) determined
by the following rules, stipulated for every α < κ,
∅  ∆κ(x, x) x,∆κ(x, y) y
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∆κ(x1, y1) ∪ ∆κ(x2, y2)∆κ(x1 (α x2, y1 (α y2). 
The importance of the logic `κE is justified as follows:
Proposition 3.6. Let ` be a logic.
(i) ` is equivalential if and only if `κE 6 ` for every (equiv. some) infinite cardinal κ > |L`|.
(ii) If κ is an infinite cardinal and `κE 6 `, then ` is equivalential.
Proof. Condition (ii) follows from the fact that equivalential logics form a Leibniz class
by Remark 2.4, while the proof of (i) is analogous to that of Proposition 3.6(i). 
For every ordinal α, let `αE be the logic `ω+|α|E .
Theorem 3.7. The sequence Φ = {`αE : α ∈ OR} is a Leibniz condition and Log(Φ) coincides
with the class of equivalential logics. In particular, equivalential logics form a Leibniz class.
Proof. Analogous to the one of Theorem 3.4. 
A logic ` is said to be assertional [1, 31] if F is a singleton for every 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`).
Proposition 3.8. Let ` be a logic.
(i) If x, y, ϕ(x,~z) ` ϕ(y,~z) for every formula ϕ(x,~z) ∈ Fm(`), then |F| 6 1 for every
〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`).
(ii) ` is assertional if and only if it has theorems and x, y, ϕ(x,~z) ` ϕ(y,~z) for every formula
ϕ(x,~z) ∈ Fm(`).
Proof. See [1, Thm. 10]. The result is attributed to Suszko in [11], see also [33]. 
To prove that assertional logics form a strong Leibniz class, we need few more concepts.
Definition 3.9. The basic assertional logic is the logic `A formulated in countably many
variables and in the language comprising just a unary connective >(x), axiomatized by
the rule ∅>(x).
A pointed set is an algebra A = 〈A;>A〉 where >A is a unary constant map on A. In
this case, we denote by >A∗ the element of A defined by the map >A : A→ A.
Proposition 3.10. The logic `A is assertional and
Mod≡(`A) = {〈A, {>A∗ }〉 : A is a pointed set}.
Proof. Due to the poor signature of `A and the fact that ∅ `A >(x), it is easy to see that
∅ `A ϕ for every formula ϕ ∈ Fm(`A) that is not a variable. As a consequence, we
obtain x, y, ϕ(x,~z) ` ϕ(y,~z) for every formula ϕ(x,~z) ∈ Fm(`A). Moreover, the logic `A
has theorems, e.g. >(x). Hence, we can apply Proposition 3.8(ii) obtaining that `A is
assertional.
Now we turn to prove the equality in the statement. First consider a matrix 〈A, F〉 ∈
Mod≡(`A). Since `A is assertional, F = {a} for some a ∈ A. Together with the fact that
>(x) is a theorem, this yields >A(c) = a for all c ∈ A. Hence >A is a constant map on A
and a = >A∗ . This establishes the inclusion from left to right.
To prove the other inclusion, let A be a pointed set. It is clear that the matrix
〈A, {>A∗ }〉 is a model of the rule ∅ >(x) and, therefore, of `A. It only remains to
prove that the congruence
∼
ΩA`A{>A∗ } is the identity relation. To this end, consider two
distinct elements a, c ∈ A. We can assume without loss of generality that c 6= >A∗ .
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Then, by the compatibility of the Leibniz congruence, we obtain 〈a, c〉 /∈ ΩA{>A∗ , a}.
Moreover, observe that the matrix 〈A, {>A∗ , a}〉 is a model of the rule ∅ >(x) and,
therefore, of the logic `A, whence ∼ΩA`A{>A∗ } ⊆ ΩA{>A∗ , a}. Hence we conclude that
〈a, c〉 /∈ ∼ΩA`A{>A∗ }. This shows that
∼
ΩA`A{>A∗ } is the identity relation and, therefore,
〈A, {>A∗ }〉 ∈ Mod≡(`A). 
As a consequence, we obtain the following:
Theorem 3.11. Assertional logics form the strong Leibniz class Log(`A).
Proof. It suffices to show that a logic ` is assertional if and only if `A 6 `. To prove the
“if” part, suppose that `A 6 ` and let τ be an interpretation of `A into `. Then consider
〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`). We have that 〈Aτ , F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`A). Together with Proposition 3.10,
this yields that F is a singleton. Hence we conclude that ` is assertional.
To prove the “only if’ part”, suppose that ` is assertional. From Proposition 3.8(ii)
we know that ` has a theorem ϕ(x). Then let τ be the translation of L`A into L` that
sends >(x) to ϕ(x). We shall see that τ is an interpretation of `A into `. To this end,
consider a matrix 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`). Since ` is assertional, there is a ∈ A such that
F = {a}. Together with the fact that ϕ(x) is a theorem of `, this implies that ϕA is
the constant map with value a. Hence Aτ = 〈A; ϕA〉 is essentially a pointed set B, and
〈Aτ , F〉 = 〈B, {>B∗ }〉. By Proposition 3.10 this guarantees that 〈Aτ , F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`A).
Hence we conclude that τ is an interpretation of `A into `. 
A logic ` is truth-equational [31] if there is a set E(x) of equations such that for every
〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`), and a ∈ A,
a ∈ F ⇐⇒ A  E(a).
Similarly, a logic ` is said to be parametrically truth-equational [27] if there is a set E(x,~y)
of equations such that for every 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`) with F 6= ∅, and a ∈ A,
a ∈ F ⇐⇒ A  E(a,~c) for every ~c ∈ A.
Theorem 3.12. Parametrically truth-equational logics, and truth-equational logics form Leibniz
classes.
Proof. We detail only the proof of the fact that parametrically truth-equational logics
form a Leibniz class. By Theorem 2.2 it will be enough to show that parametrically
truth-equational logics are closed under term-equivalence, compatible expansions, and
non-indexed products of sets. The fact that they are closed under term-equivalence, and
compatible expansions is clear. Then consider a family {`i : i ∈ I} of parametrically
truth-equational logics. For every j ∈ I, let Ej(x,~y) be the set of equations witnessing the
fact that `j is parametrically truth-equational. For every formula ϕ(x,~y) of `j, we denote
by ϕˆ the sequence 〈ϕi : i ∈ I〉 in which ϕi = x for every i ∈ I r {j}, and ϕj = ϕ. Observe
that ϕˆ(x,~y) is a basic operation of
⊗
i∈I `i. Bearing this in mind, we define
E(x,~y) := {ϕˆ ≈ ψˆ : ϕ ≈ ψ ∈ ⋃
i∈I
Ei(x,~y)}.
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Then consider a matrix 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(⊗i∈I `i) such that F 6= ∅. By [24, Prop. 4.5] we
have 〈A, F〉 6sd ⊗i∈I〈Ai, Fi〉 for some 〈Ai, Fi〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i) with Fi 6= ∅. For every a ∈ A,
a ∈ F ⇐⇒ a(i) ∈ Fi for every i ∈ I
⇐⇒ Ai  Ei(a(i),~c) for every ~c ∈ Ai and i ∈ I
⇐⇒ A  E(a,~c) for every ~c ∈ A.
The above equivalences are justified as follows: the first is straightforward, the second
follows from the fact the set Ei(x,~y) witnesses that `i is parametrically truth-equational,
and the third is a consequence of the fact that the projection pii : A→ Ai is surjective for
all i ∈ I. From the display above we obtain that ⊗i∈I `i is parametrically truth-equational,
as desired. 
Problem 1. Is it possible to find a transparent Leibniz condition Φ such that Log(Φ) is
the class of (parametrically) truth-equational logics?
A logic ` is said to be order algebraizable [32] if there is a set ∆(x, y) of formulas and
a set E(x) of inequalities such that for every 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`) the relation 4AF on A
defined as follows is a partial order: for every a, c ∈ A,
a 4AF c⇐⇒ ∆A(a, c) ⊆ F,
and for every a ∈ A,
a ∈ F ⇐⇒ 〈A,4AF 〉  E(e).
Theorem 3.13. Order algebraizable logics, and logics with theorems form Leibniz classes.
Proof. The result can be established by checking condition (ii) of Theorem 2.2 with ideas
similar to the ones in the proof of Theorem 3.12. 
We expect that a Leibniz condition defining the class of order algebraizable logics
could be extracted from [32, Thm. 7.1(ii)].
Remark 3.14. Recall from Proposition 2.6 that every class of logics that can be written
as the intersection of two Leibniz classes is still a Leibniz class. This observation can
be exploited to show that some well-known collections of logics are Leibniz classes.
For instance, a logic ` is said to be algebraizable [8] (resp. weakly algebraizable [13]) if is
equivalential (resp. protoalgebraic) and truth-equational. From Theorems 3.4, 3.12, and
3.7 it follows that (weakly) algebraizable logics form a Leibniz class. 
We conclude this section by providing some examples of collections of logics that are
not Leibniz classes. By Remark 2.5 we know that every class of logics that is not closed
under the formation of extensions will serve this purpose. Among these we count, for
instance, the class of logics with the Craig deductive interpolation property [14], and the
class of logics with the infinite (resp. finite) Beth definability property [4, 5].
To describe another interesting class of logics that is not a Leibniz class, recall that a
logic ` has an algebraic semantics [8, 10] if there are a set of equations E(x) and a class of
algebras K such that for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm(`),
Γ ` ϕ⇐⇒ ⋃{E(γ) : γ ∈ Γ} K E(ϕ)
where K is the equational consequence relative to K. Surprisingly enough, every logic
is term-equivalent to one with an algebraic semantics, as shown essentially in [10, Thm.
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3.1]. Together with the fact that some logics lack an algebraic semantics [6], this yields
that the class of logics with an algebraic semantics is not closed under term-equivalence,
whence it is not a Leibniz class by Theorem 2.2(ii).
The reader familiar with abstract algebraic logic may be interested to know that also
(fully) selfextensional, and (fully) Fregean logics [19] do not form Leibniz classes, since
these collections are not closed under compatible expansions.
Problem 2. The majority of well-known Leibniz classes can be characterized in terms of
the behaviour of the so-called Leibniz operator, i.e. the map ΩA : P(A)→ ConA, defined
on every algebra A, that associates a subset F ⊆ A with the Leibniz congruence ΩAF. Is
it possible to establish a precise relation between Leibniz classes and the behaviour of
the Leibniz operator?
Later on we make use of the following well-known observation [18].
Proposition 3.15. The classes of protoalgebraic, equivalential, assertional, order algebraizable,
and truth-equational logics comprise only logics with theorems.
4. Irreducibility, primality and their boundaries
Part of the speculative power of the identification of the Leibniz hierarchy with the
lattice of all Leibniz classes comes from the fact that it allows to apply order-theoretic
methods and intuitions to the study of the first. To explain how, recall that an element a
of a lattice 〈A;∧,∨〉 is said to be meet-irreducible if for every pair b, c ∈ A,
if a = b ∧ c, then either a = b or a = c.
Similarly, a is said to be meet-prime if for every pair b, c ∈ A,
if b ∧ c 6 a, then either b 6 a or c 6 a.
Accordingly, a is said to be meet-reducible when it is not meet-irreducible. It is clear that
every meet-prime element of 〈A;∧,∨〉 is meet-irreducible, while the converse is not true
in general.
Since the Leibniz hierarchy is a lattice (Proposition 2.6), it makes sense to ask whether
a Leibniz class is meet-irreducible or meet-prime. An affirmative answer to this question
can then be regarded as a certificate that the Leibniz class under consideration captures a
primitive or fundamental concept.
Remark 4.1. Since infima in the Leibniz hierarchy are intersections, a Leibniz class K is
meet-prime if there is no pair of logics `1,`2 /∈ K such that ` ∈ K, for every logic ` such
that `1,`2 6 `. 
Example 4.2. The Leibniz class of algebraizable (resp. weakly algebraizable) logics is
meet-reducible, since it can be obtained as the intersection of the strictly larger Leibniz
classes of equivalential (resp. protoalgebraic) logics and truth-equational logics (Remark
3.14). Moreover, there are meet-irreducible Leibniz classes that are not meet-prime, e.g.
the class of logics ` for which there is no three-element algebra A and a ∈ A such that
〈A, {a}〉 ∈ Mod≡(`). Even if we do not pursue the details here, the proof of this fact is
an adaptation of an argument in [21, pag. 54]. 
The next results put some boundaries to the expectation that well-known Leibniz
classes should be meet-irreducible or meet-prime.
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Proposition 4.3. All Leibniz classes properly included into the class of logics with theorems are
meet-reducible.
Proof sketch. Given a logic ` with theorems, we denote by `∅ the logic on Fm(`) defined
for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm(`) as
Γ `∅ ϕ⇐⇒ Γ 6= ∅ and Γ ` ϕ.
It is clear that `∅ lacks theorems. It is not hard to see that
Mod≡(`∅) = Mod≡(`) ∪ {〈A,∅〉 : 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`) for some F ⊆ A}. (3)
Then consider a Leibniz class K properly included into the Leibniz class Thrms of
logics with theorems. We set
K∅ := K∪ {`∅ : ` ∈ K}.
It is clear that K ( K∅, since K∅ contains logics without theorems. Moreover, K =
K∅ ∩ Thrms. Therefore, to conclude that K is meet-reducible, it will be enough to show
that K∅ is a Leibniz class.
To prove this, consider a Leibniz condition Φ = {`α : α ∈ OR} such that K = Log(Φ).
We define Φ∅ := {`α∅ : α ∈ OR}. From the fact that Φ is a Leibniz condition and (3) it
follows that Φ∅ is also Leibniz condition. We shall prove that K∅ = Log(Φ∅). To this
end, consider a logic ` ∈ K. Then there is α ∈ OR such that `α 6 `. Together with
(3), this implies that `α∅ 6 `,`∅. Hence we obtain K∅ ⊆ Log(Φ∅). To prove the other
inclusion, consider α ∈ OR and a logic ` with an interpretation τ of `α∅ into `. If ` has
theorems, then we can use (3) to conclude that τ is also an interpretation of `α into `,
whence ` ∈ Log(Φ) = K ⊆ K∅. Then we consider the case where ` lacks theorems.
Since `α ∈ K, the logic `α has a theorem ϕ(x). Let y be a variable different from x and
observe that y `α∅ ϕ(x). By [24, Prop. 3.3] this yields y ` τ(ϕ(x)). Then consider the
logic `+ on Fm(`) induced by the class of matrices
{〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`) : F 6= ∅}. (4)
Since y ` τ(ϕ(x)), it is clear that ∅ `+ τ(ϕ). In particular, this guarantees that Mod≡(`+)
is the class of matrices in (4). This fact, together with (3), yields that τ is an interpretation
of `α into `+. As a consequence, we obtain `+ ∈ K. Since ` coincides with `+∅ , we
conclude that ` ∈ K∅. This establishes that K∅ = Log(Φ∅) and, therefore, that K is a
Leibniz class. 
Remark 4.4. Proposition 4.3 indicates that Leibniz classes comprising only logics with
theorems (but not all of them) cannot be meet-irreducible in an absolute sense. For
this reason, we say that a Leibniz class K is meet-reducible among logics with theorems
if for every pair of Leibniz classes K1 and K2 comprising logics with theorems only, if
K = K1 ∩K2, then either K = K1 or K = K2. A similar definition applies to the case of
meet-prime Leibniz classes. 
Proposition 4.5. All Leibniz classes properly included into the class of assertional logics are not
meet-prime among Leibniz classes with theorems.
Proof. Let F be the class of logics ` with theorems such that if 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`), then
either the matrix 〈A, F〉 is trivial or |F| > 2. Using the characterization of Leibniz classes
given in Theorem 2.2(ii) it is not hard to see that F is indeed a Leibniz class.
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Now, let Asrt be the Leibniz class of assertional logics, and consider an arbitrary
Leibniz class K properly included into Asrt. It is clear that both Asrt and F are not
included into K. Bearing this in mind, it only remains to show that Asrt ∩ F ⊆ K. To
this end, consider a logic ` ∈ Asrt∩ F. Observe that every matrix 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`) is
such that F is a singleton (as ` ∈ Asrt) and, therefore, is trivial (as ` ∈ F). Thus Mod≡(`)
is the class of trivial matrices in the language of L`. As a consequence, the logic ` is
inconsistent [24, Lem. 7.1]. In particular, this guarantees that J`K is the maximum of Log
[24, Thm. 7.3]. By Theorem 2.2(iii) the collection K† is a non-empty filter of Log which
implies J`K ∈ K†. Together with K = {`′ : J`′K ∈ K†}, this yields ` ∈ K, as desired. 
5. Meet-prime Leibniz classes
In this section we show that the Leibniz class of all logics with theorems, and the
Leibniz class of truth-minimal logics that we introduce below are meet-prime in the
absolute sense. On the other hand, it is proved that the Leibniz classes of assertional
and truth-equational logics are meet-prime among the logics with theorems. As both
assertional and truth-equational logics have theorems, Proposition 4.3 guarantees that
the restriction to logics with theorems cannot be dropped here. For the present purpose,
it is convenient to start the discussion from the new class of truth-minimal logics.
5.1. Truth-minimal logics.
Definition 5.1. A logic ` is truth-minimal if for every 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`),
if 〈A, G〉 ∈ Mod≡(`) and G ⊆ F, then either G = F or G = ∅.
The next result is instrumental to construct examples of truth-minimal logics.
Proposition 5.2. Let κ be an infinite cardinal and M a class of matrices such that |F| 6 1 for
every 〈A, F〉 ∈ M. The logic ` induced by M formulated in κ variables is truth-minimal.
Proof. The assumption that |F| 6 1 for every 〈A, F〉 ∈ M implies that x, y, ϕ(x,~z) ` ϕ(y,~z)
for every formula ϕ(x,~z) ∈ Fm(`). By Proposition 3.8(i) we conclude that ` is truth-
minimal. 
Our first aim is to show that truth-minimal logics constitute a Leibniz class. To this
end, we make use of the following observation:
Lemma 5.3. Let {`i : i ∈ I} be a family of logics, and A 6sd ⊗i∈I Ai where Ai is an L`i -
algebra for every i ∈ I. If G 6= ∅ is a deductive filter of ⊗i∈I `i on A, then for every j ∈ I there
is a deductive filter Gj of `j on Aj such that G = A ∩∏i∈I Gi.
Proof. For every j ∈ I, we denote the natural projection map by pij : A → Aj, and set
Gj := pij[G].
Then we turn to prove that G = A ∩∏i∈I Gi. The inclusion from left to right is clear.
To prove the other one, consider an element a ∈ A ∩∏i∈I Gi. For every j ∈ I there is
cj ∈ G such that cj(j) = a(j). Then consider the basic operation x(j y of ⊗i∈I `i, whose
j-th component is the projection on the first coordinate, and whose i-th component is the
projection on the second coordinate for every i ∈ I r {j}. Since cj(j) = a(j),
a(Aj cj = cj ∈ G. (5)
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Now, consider some distinct variables {yj : j ∈ I} ∪ {x} ⊆ Fm(⊗i∈I `i). Bearing in
mind that
⊗
i∈I `i is the logic induced by the class
⊗
i∈I Mod≡(`i), it is easy to see that
the following rule is valid in
⊗
i∈I `i:
{x(j yj : j ∈ I} x.
Together with (5) and the fact that G is a deductive filter of
⊗
i∈I `i on A, this implies
a ∈ G. Hence we conclude
G = A ∩∏
i∈I
Gi. (6)
Consider an index j ∈ I. To conclude the proof, it suffices to show that Gj is a
filter of `j on Aj. To prove this, suppose that Γ `j ϕ and consider a homomorphism
h : Fm(`j) → Aj such that h[Γ] ⊆ Gj. For every n-ary term ψ(z1, . . . , zn) ∈ Fm(`j), let
ψˆ(z1, . . . , zn) be an arbitrary basic n-ary operation of
⊗
i∈I `i whose j-th component is
ψ. Moreover, consider a variable y ∈ Fm(⊗i∈I `i) not occurring in Γ.2 Again bearing
in mind that
⊗
i∈I `i is the logic induced by the class
⊗
i∈I Mod≡(`i), it is clear that the
following rule is valid in
⊗
i∈I `i:
{γˆ(j y : γ ∈ Γ} ϕˆ(j y. (7)
Now, choose an element a ∈ G, and let f : Fm(⊗i∈I `i) → A be a homomorphism
such that f (y) = a and f (x)(j) = h(x) for every variable x ∈ Fm(`j). Observe that there
exists such an f , since the projection pij : A→ Aj is surjective. For every i ∈ I r {j} and
γ ∈ Γ, we have
f (γˆ(j y)(i) = a(i) ∈ pii[G] = Gi
f (γˆ(j y)(j) = h(γ) ∈ Gj.
Together with (6), this implies
f (γˆ(j y) ∈ A ∩∏
i∈I
Gi = G, for every γ ∈ Γ.
The above display, together with (7) and the fact that G is a deductive filter of
⊗
i∈I `i on
A, yields that f (ϕˆ(j y) ∈ G. As a consequence, we obtain
h(ϕ) = f (ϕˆ(j y)(j) ∈ pij[G] = Gj.
Hence we conclude that Gj is a deductive filter of `j on Aj. 
As a consequence, we obtain the following:
Theorem 5.4. The class of truth-minimal logics is a Leibniz class.
Proof. It is straightforward that the class of truth-minimal logics is closed under term-
equivalence and compatible expansions. In the light of Theorem 2.2, it only remains to
prove that this class is closed under the formation of non-indexed products of sets.
To prove this, consider a family {`i : i ∈ I} of truth-minimal logics. Moreover, consider
〈A, F〉, 〈A, G〉 ∈ Mod≡(⊗i∈I `i) with ∅ 6= G ⊆ F. We need to show that F = G. By
[24, Prop. 4.5] there is a family of matrices {〈Ai, Fi〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i) : i ∈ I} such that
2In case there is no such a variable y, we replace in the proof Γ∪{ϕ} by σ[Γ∪ ϕ], where σ is a substitution
on Fm(`j) that maps variables to variables, and that is injective but not surjective.
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〈A, F〉 6sd ⊗i∈I〈Ai, Fi〉. By Lemma 5.3, for every j ∈ I there is a deductive filter Gj of `j
on Aj such that
∅ 6= Gj ⊆ Fj (8)
and G = A ∩∏i∈I Gi. Now, from the fact that Gj is a deductive filter of `j and Gj ⊆ Fj
it follows that
∼
ΩA`j Gj ⊆
∼
ΩA`j Fj. Therefore, bearing in mind that
∼
ΩA`j Fj is the identity
relation, we conclude that the same holds for
∼
ΩA`j Gj. In particular, this yields
〈Aj, Gj〉 ∈ Mod≡(`j). (9)
Finally, for every j ∈ J we can apply the fact that `j is truth-minimal to (8, 9), obtaining
that Fj = Gj. As a consequence, we get
G = A ∩∏
i∈I
Gi = A ∩∏
i∈I
Fj = F.
Hence we conclude that
⊗
i∈I `i is truth-minimal. 
To prove that the Leibniz class of truth-minimal logics is meet-prime, we rely on the
following technical observations:
Lemma 5.5. Let ` be a logic. If 〈A, A〉 ∈ Mod≡(`), then A is the trivial algebra.
Proof. From [24, Prop. 2.2(ii)] we obtain
∼
ΩA`A = A × A. On the other hand, since
〈A, A〉 ∈ Mod≡(`), the congruence ∼ΩA`A is the identity relation. But the fact that A× A
is the identity relation implies that A is a singleton, as desired. 
Lemma 5.6. Let ` be a logic, and 〈A, F〉, 〈A, G〉 ∈ Mod≡(`) such that ∅ 6= G ( F. There are
〈B, F†〉, 〈B, G†〉 ∈ Mod≡(`) such that ∅ 6= G† ( F† ( B and
ω 6 |B| = |G†| = |F† r G†| = |Br F†|.
Proof. Choose an infinite cardinal κ > |A| and define B := Aκ × Aκ. Then set
F† := Fκ × Fκ and G† := Fκ × Gκ.
Since Mod≡(`) is closed under direct products [24, Lem. 2.3], we obtain
〈B, F†〉, 〈B, G†〉 ∈ Mod≡(`).
Moreover, from ∅ 6= G ( F it follows ∅ 6= G† ( F†.
Observe that since ∅ 6= G ( F, the set F contains at least two distinct elements. This
fact and ∅ 6= G ( F guarantee that
2κ 6 |Fκ × Gκ| = |G†| (10)
2κ 6 |Fκ| 6 |Fκ × (Fκ r Gκ)| = |F† r G†| (11)
Since F contains at least two elements and 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`), we can apply Lemma 5.5
obtaining F ( A. Bearing this in mind, we get F† ( B and
2κ 6 |Aκ| 6 |Aκ × (Aκ r Fκ)| 6 |Br F†|. (12)
Finally, from κ > ω+ |A| it follows |B| = |Aκ × Aκ| = 2κ. But, together with (10, 11,
12), this yields
ω 6 |B| = |G†| = |F† r G†| = |Br F†|. 
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Lemma 5.7. Let `1 and `2 be logics, and for every i = 1, 2 let 〈Ai, Fi〉, 〈Ai, Gi〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i)
such that ∅ 6= Gi ( Fi. There are sets ∅ 6= G ( F ( B, an L`1-algebra B1, and an L`2-algebra
B2 such that B1 = B2 = B, and
〈B1, F〉, 〈B1, G〉 ∈ Mod≡(`1)
〈B2, F〉, 〈B2, G〉 ∈ Mod≡(`2).
Proof. By Lemma 5.6 for every i = 1, 2 there are 〈Ci, F†i 〉, 〈Ci, G†i 〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i) such that
∅ 6= G†i ( F†i ( Ci and ω 6 |Ci| = |G†i | = |F†i r G†i | = |Ci r F†i |.
Let then κ := max{|C1|, |C2|}. Consider also i = 1, 2. Since Mod≡(`i) is closed under
direct powers [24, Lem. 2.3], we obtain
〈Cκi , (F†i )κ〉, 〈Cκi , (G†i )κ〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i). (13)
Moreover, since ∅ 6= G†i ( F†i ( Ci, we have
∅ 6= G†κi ( F†κi ( Cκi .
Finally, since ω 6 |Ci| = |G†i | = |F†i r G†i | = |Ci r F†i | 6 κ, we have
κ = |Cκi | = |G†κi | = |F†κi r G†κi | = |Cκi r F†κi |. (14)
Then consider some sets ∅ 6= G ( F ( B such that
κ = |B| = |G| = |Fr G| = |Br F|.
From (13) and (14) it easily follows that for each i = 1, 2 there is an L`i -algebra Bi
with universe B such that 〈Bi, F〉 ∼= 〈Cκi , (F†i )κ〉, 〈Bi, G〉 ∼= 〈Cκi , (G†i )κ〉 and, therefore,〈Bi, F〉, 〈Bi, G〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i). 
We are now ready to prove the main result of this part:
Theorem 5.8. The Leibniz class of truth-minimal logics is meet-prime.
Proof. Consider two logics `1 and `2 that are not truth-minimal. It will be enough to
construct a logic ` that is not truth-minimal and in which `1 and `2 are interpretable.
To this end, observe that for every i = 1, 2 there are 〈Ai, Fi〉, 〈Ai, Gi〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i) such
that ∅ 6= Gi ( Fi. From Lemma 5.7 we obtain
〈B1, F〉, 〈B1, G〉 ∈ Mod≡(`1) and 〈B2, F〉, 〈B2, G〉 ∈ Mod≡(`2)
for some sets ∅ 6= G ( F ( B, an L`1-algebra B1, and an L`2-algebra B2 such that
B1 = B2 = B.
Let B be the common expansion of B1 and B2 with all finitary operations on B.
Moreover, let ` be the logic, formulated in κ := max{|Fm(`1)|, |Fm(`2)|} variables
induced by the set of matrices
K := {〈B, F〉, 〈B, G〉}.
We claim that ` is equivalential. To prove this, consider elements 0 ∈ Br F and 1 ∈ G
(this is possible, since ∅ 6= G and F ( B). Then let x( y be the binary basic operation
of B defined as follows for every a, c ∈ B,
a(B c :=
{
1 if a = c
0 otherwise.
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Bearing in mind that 0 /∈ F ∪ G and 1 ∈ F ∩ G, it is not hard to see that the set
∆(x, y) := {x( y} satisfies the conditions in the right hand side of [24, Thm. 2.7]. As a
consequence we obtain that ` is equivalential, establishing the claim.
Since B is endowed with all unary constant maps, we have S(K) = K. Moreover, for
each pair of different a, c ∈ B, we have
a(B c = 0 /∈ G ∪ F and a(B a = 1 ∈ G ∩ F.
By [24, Prop. 2.2(i)] this implies that the matrices in K are reduced. This fact, together
with the claim and S(K) = K, allows us to apply [24, Prop. 3.9] obtaining that the identity
maps are interpretations of `1 and `2 into `. Moreover, ` is not truth-minimal, as
witnessed by the fact that K ⊆ Mod≡(`) and ∅ 6= G ( F. 
The proof strategy described above can be adapted to the case of truth-equational and
assertional logics, as we proceed to explain.
5.2. Truth-equational logics. To prove that the Leibniz class of truth-equational logics
is meet-prime among logics with theorems, it is convenient to recall the following
characterization result.
Theorem 5.9. A logic ` is truth-equational if and only if for every algebra A,
if 〈A, F〉, 〈A, G〉 ∈ Mod≡(`), then F = G.
Proof. See [31, Prop. 17 and Thm. 2.8]. 
As a consequence we obtain the desired result.
Theorem 5.10. The Leibniz class of truth-equational logics is meet-prime among logics with
theorems.
Proof. Consider two logics `1 and `2 with theorems that are not truth-equational. It will
be enough to construct a logic ` that is not truth-equational and in which `1 and `2 are
interpretable.
First we claim that for every i = 1, 2 there are 〈Ai, Fi〉, 〈Ai, Gi〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i) such
that ∅ 6= Gi ( Fi. To prove this, consider i = 1, 2. Since the logic `i is not truth-
equational, we can apply Theorem 5.9 obtaining an algebra Ai and distinct Ui, Vi ⊆ Ai
such that 〈Ai, Ui〉, 〈Ai, Vi〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i). We can assume without loss of generality that
Vi rUi 6= ∅. Bearing this in mind, we define Fi := Vi and Gi := Vi ∩Ui. It is clear that
〈Ai, Gi〉 ∈ Mod(`i) and Gi ( Fi. Since `i has theorems, the fact that 〈Ai, Gi〉 ∈ Mod(`i)
implies that Gi 6= ∅. Moreover, since Gi ⊆ Fi = Vi, we have
∼
ΩAi`i Gi ⊆
∼
ΩAi`i Vi.
Recall that
∼
ΩAi`i Vi is the identity relation, since 〈Ai, Vi〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i). Hence
∼
ΩAi`i Gi is also
the identity relation and, therefore, 〈Ai, Gi〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i). Finally, by the assumptions,
〈Ai, Fi〉 = 〈Ai, Vi〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i). This concludes the proof of the claim.
Together with Lemma 5.7, the claim implies that there are
〈B1, F〉, 〈B1, G〉 ∈ Mod≡(`1) and 〈B2, F〉, 〈B2, G〉 ∈ Mod≡(`2)
for some sets ∅ 6= G ( F ( B, an L`1-algebra B1, and an L`2-algebra B2 such that
B1 = B2 = B.
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Now, let B be the common expansion of B1 and B2 with all finitary operations on
B. Moreover, let ` be the logic, formulated in κ := max{|Fm(`1)|, |Fm(`2)|} variables
induced by the set of matrices
K := {〈B, F〉, 〈B, G〉}.
As in the proof of Theorem 5.8, we obtain K ⊆ Mod≡(`) and `1,`2 6 `. Finally,
applying Theorem 5.9 to the fact that K ⊆ Mod≡(`) and F 6= G, we conclude that ` is
not truth-equational. 
5.3. Assertional logics.
Theorem 5.11. The Leibniz class of assertional logics is meet-prime among logics with theorems.
Proof. Consider two logics `1 and `2 with theorems that are not assertional. As usual, it
will be enough to construct a logic ` that is not assertional and in which `1 and `2 are
interpretable.
We claim that for every i = 1, 2 there are 〈Ai, Fi〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i) such that |Fi| > 2 and
Fi ( Ai. To prove this, consider i = 1, 2, and observe that the fact that `i is not assertional
implies that there is 〈Ai, Fi〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i) such that Fi is not a singleton. Since `i has
theorems and 〈Ai, Fi〉 is a model of `i we know that Fi 6= ∅ and, therefore, |Fi| > 2. This
fact, together with Lemma 5.5, ensures that Fi ( Ai, establishing the claim.
By the claim we can find a cardinal κ large enough to guarantee that
|Aκ1| = |Fκ1 | = |Aκ1 r Fκ1 | = |Aκ2| = |Fκ2 | = |Aκ2 r Fκ2 |.
Thus there is a set B, a set F ⊆ B, an L`1-algebra B1, and an L`2-algebra B2 such that
B1 = B2 = B and
〈B1, F〉 ∼= 〈Aκ1, Fκ1 〉 and 〈B2, F〉 ∼= 〈Aκ2, Fκ2 〉.
Since Mod≡(`i) is closed under the formation of direct powers for every i = 1, 2 [24, Lem.
2.3], we obtain 〈B1, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`1) and 〈B2, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`2).
Now, let B be the common expansion of B1 and B2 with all finitary operations on
B. Moreover, let ` be the logic, formulated in κ := max{|Fm(`1)|, |Fm(`2)|} variables
induced by the matrix 〈B, F〉. As in the proof of Theorem 5.8, we obtain 〈B, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`)
and `1,`2 6 `. Finally, since 〈B, F〉 and F is not a singleton, we conclude that ` is not
assertional. 
Remark 5.12. In Theorems 5.10 and 5.11 it is shown that the Leibniz classes of truth-
equational and assertional logics are meet-prime among logics with theorems. As we
mentioned, in the light of Proposition 4.3 this restriction cannot be dropped. 
5.4. Logics with theorems.
Theorem 5.13. The Leibniz class of logics with theorems is meet-prime.
Proof. Let `AI be an almost inconsistent logic, and recall that if ` is a logic without
theorems, then ` 6 `AI [24, Thm. 7.3]. Together with the fact that `IA lacks theorems,
this immediately implies that the Leibniz class of logics with theorems is meet-prime. 
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6. Meet-reducible Leibniz classes
Recall that protoalgebraic, equivalential, and order algebraizable logics have theorems.
In the light of Proposition 4.3 the corresponding Leibniz classes are trivially meet-
reducible. In this section we strengthen this result by proving that they remain meet-
reducible even among the restricted setting of logics with theorems. In addition, it is
shown that the Leibniz class of parametrically truth-equational logics is meet-reducible
in the absolute sense.3 Remarkably, the latter result cannot be inferred directly from
Proposition 4.3, since parametrically truth-equational logics need not have theorems [27,
Sec. 4]. In what follows we rely on the next technical observation:
Proposition 6.1. Let `1,`2, and ` be logics, and τ an interpretation of `1 ⊗ `2 into `. Then
for every 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`) there are 〈A1, F1〉 ∈ Mod≡(`1), 〈A2, F2〉 ∈ Mod≡(`2), and an
isomorphism
f : 〈A1
⊗
A2, F1 × F2〉 → 〈Aτ , F〉.
Moreover, for every submatrix 〈B, F ∩ B〉 ⊆ 〈A, F〉 and i = 1, 2, there is a submatrix 〈Bi, Fi ∩
Bi〉 ⊆ 〈Ai, Fi〉 such that:
(i) the following restriction of f is a well-defined isomorphism:
f : 〈B1
⊗
B2, (F1 ∩ B1)× (F2 ∩ B2)〉 → 〈Bτ , F ∩ B〉;
(ii) if F ∩ B 6= ∅, then for every θ ∈ ConB compatible with F ∩ B and every i = 1, 2, there is
θi ∈ ConBi compatible with Fi ∩ Bi such that
θ = {〈 f 〈a, b〉, f 〈c, d〉〉 : 〈a, c〉 ∈ θ1 and 〈b, d〉 ∈ θ2}.
Proof. The fact that there are 〈A1, F1〉 ∈ Mod≡(`1), 〈A2, F2〉 ∈ Mod≡(`2), and an isomor-
phism f : 〈A1 ⊗ A2, F1 × F2〉 → 〈Aτ , F〉 is a direct consequence of [24, Cor. 4.14]. From
now on we assume without loss of generality that f is the identity map and, therefore,
that
〈Aτ , F〉 = 〈A1
⊗
A2, F1 × F2〉.
(i): Consider a submatrix 〈B, F ∩ B〉 ⊆ 〈A, F〉. Therefore, Bτ ⊆ Aτ = A1 ⊗ A2. As a
consequence, for every i = 1, 2 there is Bi ⊆ Ai such that Bτ = B1 ⊗ B2 [35, Lem. 1.10].
Moreover, since B = B1 × B2 and F = F1 × F2,
F ∩ B = (F1 × F2) ∩ (B1 × B2) = (F1 ∩ B1)× (F2 ∩ B2).
As a consequence, we obtain
〈Bτ , F ∩ B〉 = 〈B1
⊗
B2, (F1 ∩ B1)× (F2 ∩ B2)〉.
(ii): Consider θ ∈ ConB compatible with F ∩ B. Clearly θ ∈ ConBτ = Con(B1 ⊗ B2).
As shown in [35, Lem. 1.12], for every i = 1, 2 there is θi ∈ ConBi such that
θ = {〈〈a, b〉, 〈c, d〉〉 : 〈a, c〉 ∈ θ1 and 〈b, d〉 ∈ θ2}.
We turn to prove that θ1 is compatible with F1 ∩ B1. To this end, consider a, c ∈ B1 such
that a ∈ F1 ∩ B1 and 〈a, c〉 ∈ θ1. From the assumption we have (F1 ∩ B1)× (F2 ∩ B2) = F∩
B 6= ∅. Then there is b ∈ F2 ∩ B2. From the above display it follows that 〈〈a, b〉, 〈c, b〉〉 ∈ θ.
Since θ is compatible with F and 〈a, b〉 ∈ F1 × F2 = F, we get 〈c, b〉 ∈ F = F1 × F2. In
3These negative results are compensated by some positive ones in Section 7 at least for what concerns
protoalgebraic and equivalential logics.
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particular, this guarantees that c ∈ F1 ∩ B1. As a consequence we conclude that θ1 is
compatible with F1 ∩ B1. A similar argument shows that θ2 is compatible with F2 ∩ B2. 
6.1. Protoalgebraic logics. Our aim is to show that the Leibniz class of protoalgebraic
logics is meet-reducible among logics with theorems. To this end, it is useful to recall a
few concepts. An algebra A is said to be congruence uniform [3, Sec. 7.1] if |a/θ| = |b/θ|,
for every a, b ∈ A and θ ∈ ConA. It is well-known that Boolean algebras are congruence
uniform.
We denote by BA the variety of Boolean algebras, and by `∗BA the logic formulated in
countably many variables induced by the following class of matrices:
{〈A, F〉 : A ∈ BA and 1 ∈ F}.
Lemma 6.2. The logic `∗BA has theorems, but is not protoalgebraic. Moreover, the algebraic
reducts of the matrices in Mod≡(`∗BA) belong to BA.
Proof. Clearly 1 is a theorem of `∗BA. Moreover, the fact that the algebraic reducts of the
matrices in Mod≡(`∗BA) belong to BA is an immediate consequence of [24, Cor. 2.6].
It only remains to prove that `∗BA is not protoalgebraic. Suppose the contrary, with
a view to contradiction. Then there is a set ∆(x, y,~z) of congruence formulas with
parameters for `∗BA. We consider the four-element Boolean algebra A with universe{a, b, 0, 1}, where 0 and 1 are respectively the bottom and the top element of the lattice
order. Then we set F := {1, a} and G := {1, a, b}. From the definition of `∗BA it follows
that 〈A, F〉, 〈A, G〉 ∈ Mod(`∗BA). Together with the fact that ∆ is a set of congruence
formulas with parameters for `∗BA and that F ⊆ G, this yields that for every p, q ∈ A,
〈p, q〉 ∈ ΩAF ⇐⇒∆A(p, q,~c) ⊆ F, for every ~c ∈ A
=⇒∆A(p, q,~c) ⊆ G, for every ~c ∈ A
⇐⇒〈p, q〉 ∈ ΩAG.
Hence we conclude that ΩAF ⊆ ΩAG. On the other hand, it is easy to see that ΩAG is
the identity relation, while ΩAF is the congruence with blocks {1, a} and {0, b}. But this
contradicts the fact that ΩAF ⊆ ΩAG, as desired. 
We denote by Proto the Leibniz class of protoalgebraic logics, and by Asrt that of
assertional logics. Bearing this in mind, we obtain the following result, in which suprema
are taken in the Leibniz hierarchy.
Theorem 6.3. The Leibniz class of protoalgebraic logics is meet-reducible among logics with
theorems, and can be described as follows:
(Proto∨ Asrt) ∩ (Proto∨ Log(`∗BA)).
Proof. We set
K1 := Proto∨ Asrt and K2 := Proto∨ Log(`∗BA).
Observe that K1 and K2 are Leibniz classes by Theorems 3.4 and 3.11. Moreover, they
comprise only logics with theorems by Propositions 2.6 and 3.15. We have
Proto ( K1 and Equiv ( K2. (15)
The validity of the inclusion Proto ⊆ K1 ∩K2 is straightforward. The fact that Proto ( K1
is witnessed by the existence of assertional logics that are not protoalgebraic [31, Ex. 7].
Finally, the fact that the inclusion Equiv ⊆ K2 is strict follows from Lemma 6.2.
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In the light of (15), it only remains to prove that K1 ∩K2 ⊆ Proto. Suppose the contrary,
with a view to contradiction. Then there is a logic ` ∈ K1 ∩K2 that is not protoalgebraic.
By Proposition 2.6, and considering that the non-indexed product of two protoalgebraic
logics is protoalgebraic and interpretable in each of them, there are a protoalgebraic logic
`pr and an assertional logic `as such that
`pr
⊗ `as 6 ` and `pr ⊗ `∗BA 6 `. (16)
Since ` has theorems and is not protoalgebraic, we can apply Theorem 3.1(ii) obtaining
that Mod≡(`) 6= R(Mod≡(`)), i.e. that there is a matrix 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`) such that
ΩAF is not the identity relation.
We claim that for every pair of different a, c ∈ A, if 〈a, c〉 ∈ ΩAF, then a, c /∈ F. To prove
this, consider different a, c ∈ A such that 〈a, c〉 ∈ ΩAF. By (16) there is an interpretation
τ of `pr ⊗ `as into `. By Proposition 6.1 we obtain without loss of generality that4
〈Aτ , F〉 = 〈A1
⊗
A2, F1 × F2〉
for some 〈A1, F1〉 ∈ Mod≡(`pr) and 〈A2, F2〉 ∈ Mod≡(`as). Since a, c ∈ A = A1 × A2,
there are a1, c1 ∈ A1 and a2, c2 ∈ A2 such that
a = 〈a1, a2〉 and c = 〈c1, c2〉.
From Proposition 6.1(ii) it follows that there are θ1 ∈ ConA1 and θ2 ∈ ConA2 compati-
ble with F1 and F2, respectively, such that
ΩAF = {〈〈p, q〉, 〈r, s〉〉 : 〈p, r〉 ∈ θ1 and 〈q, s〉 ∈ θ2}. (17)
Since `pr is protoalgebraic and 〈A1, F1〉 ∈ Mod≡(`pr), we can apply Theorem 3.1(ii)
obtaining that ΩA1 F1 is the identity relation. Together with the fact that θ1 ⊆ ΩA1 F1 and
(17), this yields
ΩAF = {〈〈p, q〉, 〈p, s〉〉 : p ∈ A1 and 〈q, s〉 ∈ θ2}. (18)
Since 〈a, c〉 ∈ ΩAF and a 6= c, we conclude that a2 6= c2 and 〈a2, c2〉 ∈ θ2.
Now, from the fact that θ2 is compatible with F2 and 〈a2, c2〉 ∈ θ2, it follows
either a2, c2 ∈ F2 or a2, c2 /∈ F2. (19)
Since `as is assertional and 〈A2, F2〉 ∈ Mod≡(`as), we know that F2 is a singleton.
Together with a2 6= c2 and (19), this yields that a2, c2 /∈ F2. As a consequence, we obtain
〈a, c〉 /∈ F1 × F2 = F, establishing the claim.
Now, by (16) there is an interpretation τ of `pr ⊗ `∗BA into `. By Proposition 6.1 we
obtain without loss of generality that
〈Aτ , F〉 = 〈A1
⊗
A2, F1 × F2〉
for some 〈A1, F1〉 ∈ Mod≡(`pr) and 〈A2, F2〉 ∈ Mod≡(`∗BA).
Recall that the matrix 〈A, F〉 is not reduced. Then there are different a, c ∈ A such that
〈a, c〉 ∈ ΩAF. Since A = A1 × A2, there are a1, c1 ∈ A1 and a2, c2 ∈ A2 such that
a = 〈a1, a2〉 and c = 〈c1, c2〉.
4For the sake of simplicity we assume that the map f in the statement of Proposition 6.1 is the identity.
This assumption will be used systematically in this section without further notice.
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As in the proof of the claim, we obtain
ΩAF = {〈〈p, q〉, 〈p, s〉〉 : p ∈ A1 and 〈q, s〉 ∈ θ} (20)
for some θ ∈ ConA2 compatible with F2. Then we choose elements e1 ∈ F1 and e2 ∈ F2
(the fact that the logics `pr and `∗BA have theorems guarantees F1, F2 6= ∅). Clearly we
have
〈e1, e2〉 ∈ F1 × F2 = F. (21)
Together with a 6= c and 〈a, c〉 ∈ ΩAF, the display (20) implies a2 6= c2 and 〈a2, c2〉 ∈ θ.
Since 〈A2, F2〉 ∈ Mod≡(`∗BA), we can apply Lemma 6.2 obtaining that A2 is a Boolean
algebra. Since A2 is congruence uniform and θ identifies two distinct elements of A2
(namely a2 and c2), then there is b ∈ A2r {e2} such that 〈e2, b〉 ∈ θ. By (20) we conclude
〈〈e1, e2〉, 〈e1, b〉〉 ∈ ΩAF and 〈e1, e2〉 6= 〈e1, b〉.
Together with (21) this contradicts the claim. This produces the desired contradiction. 
6.2. Equivalential logics. To prove that the Leibniz class of equivalential logics is meet-
reducible among logics with theorems, we need to introduce a new concept:
Definition 6.4. A formula ϕ(x) is an injective theorem of a logic ` if ϕ(x) is a theorem of
` and for every 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`) the term-function ϕA : A→ A is injective.
We will rely on the following:
Proposition 6.5. Logics with an injective theorem form a Leibniz class, comprising a protoalge-
braic non-equivalential logic.
The proof of the above result proceeds through a series of technical observations.
Fact 1. Logics with an injective theorem form a Leibniz class.
Proof. It is not hard to show that logics with an injective theorem are closed under
term-equivalence, compatible expansions, and non-indexed products of sets. In the light
of Theorem 2.2 this implies that they form a Leibniz class. 
Consider the logic `∇, formulated in countably many variables and in the language
consisting of a single binary connective→, axiomatized by the following rules:
∅ x → x x, x → y y.
The logic `∇ has been studied in depth in [15, 16, 17]. We set ∇(x, y) := {x → y}.
Fact 2. The logic `∇ is protoalgebraic with set of congruence formulas with parameters
∇ˆ(x, y,~z) := {ϕ(x,~z)→ ϕ(y,~z) : ϕ(x,~z) ∈ Fm(`)}.
Proof. The logic `∇ is protoalgebraic, since the set ∇(x, y) satisfies the requirements of
Theorem 3.1(iv). By the same theorem, ∇ˆ is a set of congruence formulas for `∇. 
Fact 3. For every formula ϕ ∈ Fm(`∇),
∅ `∇ ϕ⇐⇒ ϕ = ψ→ ψ, for some formula ψ.
Proof. See [16, Prop. 2.1]. 
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Now, consider the extension `∆ of `∇, obtained adding for each ψ ∈ ∇ˆ(x, y,~z) the
rule
∇ˆ(x → x, y→ y,~z) ψ. (22)
Fact 4. The logic `∆ is protoalgebraic.
Proof. This is a consequence of Fact 2, together with the fact that protoalgebraicity is
preserved by extensions. 
Fact 5. The formula x → x is an injective theorem of `∆.
Proof. Clearly x → x is a theorem of `∆. Then consider 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`∆) and a, b ∈ A
such that a →A a = b →A b. We need to show that a = b. To this end, recall by Fact 4
that `∆ is protoalgebraic. Then we can apply Theorem 3.1(iii), obtaining that the matrix
〈A, F〉 is reduced, i.e. that the congruence ΩAF is the identity relation. Therefore, to
conclude the proof, it will be enough to show that 〈a, b〉 ∈ ΩAF. By [24, Prop. 2.2(i)] this
amounts to establishing that for every formula ϕ(x,~z) ∈ Fm(`∆) and every ~c ∈ A,
ϕA(a,~c) ∈ F ⇐⇒ ϕA(b,~c) ∈ F. (23)
To prove the implication from left to right, consider ϕ(x,~z) ∈ Fm(`∆) and ~c ∈ A such
that ϕA(a,~c) ∈ F. Consider also an arbitrary formula ψ(x,~z) ∈ Fm(`∇). We have that
ψ(x,~z)→ ψ(x,~z) is a theorem of `∆. Together with the fact that a→A a = b→A b, this
yields
ψA(a→ a,~c)→ ψA(b→ b,~c) = ψA(a→ a,~c)→ ψA(a→ a,~c) ∈ F.
Hence we conclude that ∇ˆ(a→A a, b→A b,~c) ⊆ F. Since 〈A, F〉 is a model of (22), this
implies ∇ˆ(a, b,~c) ⊆ F. As a consequence, we obtain ϕA(a,~c) → ϕA(b,~c) ∈ F. Together
with the assumption that ϕA(a,~c) ∈ F, and the fact that 〈A, F〉 is a model of the rule
x, x → y  y, this implies ϕA(b,~c) ∈ F. This concludes the proof of the left to right
implication in (23). The proof of the other implication is analogous. From (23) it follows
that 〈a, b〉 ∈ ΩAF and, therefore, a = b. 
Now, recall that a rule Γ ϕ is admissible [34] in a logic `, if its addition to ` does not
produce new theorems. Equivalently, this means that ∅ ` σϕ, for every substitution σ
such that ∅ ` σ[Γ].
Fact 6. The rules in (22) are admissible in `∇.
Proof. To prove this, consider a substitution σ such that ∅ `∇ σ[∇ˆ(x → x, y → y,~z)].
Since x → y ∈ ∇ˆ(x, y,~z), we have (x → x) → (y → y) ∈ ∇ˆ(x → x, y → y,~z). As
a consequence, we obtain ∅ `∇ (σx → σx) → (σy → σy). By Fact 3 this implies
σx → σx = σy→ σy and, therefore, σx = σy. Since ∅ `∇ x → x and σx = σy, we obtain
∅ `∇ σϕ(x,~z)→ σϕ(y,~z), for every formula ϕ(x,~z) ∈ Fm(`∇). But this amounts to the
fact that ∅ `∇ σ[∇ˆ(x, y,~z)]. Hence we conclude that the rules in (22) are admissible in
`∇. 
Given a formula ϕ, we denote by Var(ϕ) the set of variables occurring in ϕ.
Fact 7. The logic `∆ is not equivalential.
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Proof. Suppose, with a view to contradiction, that `∆ is equivalential. Then `∆ has a set
of congruence formulas ∆(x, y).
We claim that ∅ `∆ ϕ, for every formula ϕ such that ∆(x, y) `∆ ϕ and Var(ϕ) * {x, y}.
To demonstrate this, we reason by complete induction on the length of proofs in `∆.
Consider an ordinal α, and suppose that ∅ `∆ ψ, for every formula ψ such that Var(ϕ) *
{x, y}, and of which the exists a proof indexed by an ordinal < α from ∆(x, y). Now, let
pi := {γβ : β < α} be a proof of a formula ϕ such that Var(ϕ) * {x, y} from ∆(x, y). If
ϕ is a substitution instance of the axiom x → x, then it is a theorem and we are done.
Moreover, observe that ϕ /∈ ∆(x, y), since Var(ϕ) * {x, y}. Therefore, ϕ is obtained by
the application of one of the inference rules of `∆ to a proper initial segment of pi.
First consider the case where ϕ is obtained by an application of the rule x, x → y y.
Then there is some formula ψ such that ψ and ψ→ ϕ appear in a proper initial segment
of pi. Since Var(ϕ) * {x, y}, then Var(ψ → ϕ) ⊆ {x, y}. Therefore we can apply the
induction hypothesis obtaining ∅ `∆ ψ→ ϕ. By Fact 6 we get ∅ `∇ ψ→ ϕ. Moreover,
by Fact 3 this yields ψ = ϕ. In particular, this implies Var(ψ) * {x, y}. Therefore we
can apply the induction hypothesis, obtaining ∅ `∆ ψ. Since ϕ = ψ, we conclude that
∅ `∆ ϕ, as desired.
Then we consider the case where ϕ is obtained by an application of one of the rules
in (22). Then there is a substitution σ and a formula ψ(x, y,~z) ∈ ∇ˆ(x, y,~z) such that
ϕ = σψ, and each element of σ[∇ˆ(x → x, y→ y,~z)] appears in a proper initial segment
of pi. Suppose, with a view to contradiction, that ∅ 0∆ σψ. Since ψ ∈ ∇ˆ(x, y,~z),
there is a formula γ(x, y,~z) ∈ Fm(`∇) such that ψ = γ(x, y,~z) → γ(y, y,~z). Together
with the fact that ∅ `∆ x → x and ∅ 0∆ σψ, this yields σ(γ(x, y,~z)) 6= σ(γ(y, y,~z)).
But this easily implies σx 6= σy and x ∈ Var(γ(x, y,~z)). As a consequence we obtain
σ(γ(x → x, y→ y,~z)) 6= σ(γ(y→ y, y→ y,~z)). Moreover, from Facts 6 and 3, this yields
∅ 0∆ σ(γ(x → x, y→ y,~z))→ σ(γ(y→ y, y→ y,~z)),
which amounts to
∅ 0∆ σψ(x → x, y,→ y,~z), where ψ = ψ(x, y,~z). (24)
Now, from the fact that Var(σψ) = Var(ϕ) * {x, y} it follows
Var(σψ(x → x, y→ y,~z)) * {x, y}.
The above display and the fact that σψ(x → x, y → y,~z) ∈ σ[∇ˆ(x → x, y → y,~z)] allow
us to apply the induction hypothesis, obtaining
∅ `∆ σψ(x → x, y→ y,~z).
But this contradicts (24). Hence we conclude that ∅ `∆ σψ, establishing the claim.
Now we move back to the main proof. First observe that
∆(x, y) `∆ (x → z)→ (y→ z). (25)
To prove this, consider 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod(`∆) and a, b, c ∈ A such that ∆A(a, b) ⊆ F. Since ∆
is a set of congruence formulas for `∆, this yields 〈a, b〉 ∈ ΩAF and, therefore,
〈(a→ c)→ (a→ c), (a→ c)→ (b→ c)〉 ∈ ΩAF.
Since x → x is a theorem of `∆, we have that (a → c) → (a → c) ∈ F. As ΩAF is
compatible with F, this implies (a → c) → (b → c) ∈ F, establishing (25). From (25)
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and the claim it follows that ∅ `∆ (x → z) → (y → z). By Facts 6 and 3 this yields
x → z = y→ z, which is false. 
We also rely on the following result [18, Thm. 6.73]:
Theorem 6.6. A protoalgebraic logic ` is equivalential if and only if Mod≡(`) is closed under S.
We denote by Equiv and Injctv the Leibniz classes of equivalential logics and of logics
with an an injective theorem, respectively. Bearing this in mind, the main result of this
part takes the following form:
Theorem 6.7. The Leibniz class of equivalential logics is meet-reducible among logics with
theorems, and can be described as follows:
(Equiv ∨ (Proto∩ Injctv)) ∩ (Equiv ∨ (Proto∩ Asrt)).
Proof. We begin by setting
K1 := Equiv ∨ (Proto∩ Injctv) and K2 := Equiv ∨ (Proto∩ Asrt).
The fact thatK1 andK2 are Leibniz classes is a consequence of Theorems 3.4, 3.7, and 3.11,
and Proposition 6.5. Moreover, they comprise only logics with theorems by Propositions
2.6 and 3.15. We have
Equiv ( K1 and Equiv ( K2. (26)
The validity of the inclusion Equiv ⊆ K1 ∩K2 is straightforward. Moreover, Proposition
6.5 guarantees that Equiv ( K1. Finally, the fact that the inclusion Equiv ⊆ K2 is strict
follows from the following observation [13, Prop. 6.1 and Thm. 6.4]:
(Proto∩ Asrt)r Equiv 6= ∅.
In the light of (26), it only remains to prove K1 ∩K2 ⊆ Equiv. Suppose the contrary,
with a view to contradiction. Then there is a logic ` ∈ K1 ∩K2 that is not equivalential.
By Proposition 2.6 there are an equivalential logic `eq, a protoalgebraic logic with an
injective theorem `pin, and an assertional protoalgebraic logic `ap such that
`eq
⊗ `pin 6 ` and `eq ⊗ `ap 6 `. (27)
Together with [24, Prop. 3.8] this implies that ` is term-equivalent to a compatible
expansion of the non-indexed product of a pair of protoalgebraic logics. Since protoal-
gebraic logics form a Leibniz class, by Theorem 2.2(ii) we conclude that ` is protoalge-
braic. Moreover, since ` is not equivalential, we can apply Theorem 6.6 obtaining that
Mod≡(`) is not closed under S, i.e. there is a matrix 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`) with a submatrix
〈B, F ∩ B〉 ⊆ 〈A, F〉 such that 〈B, F ∩ B〉 /∈ Mod≡(`).
We claim that for every pair of different a, c ∈ B, if 〈a, c〉 ∈ ΩB(F ∩ B), then a, b /∈ F.
To prove this, consider different a, c ∈ B such that 〈a, c〉 ∈ ΩB(F ∩ B). By (28) there is
an interpretation τ of `eq ⊗ `ap into `. By Proposition 6.1(i) we obtain without loss of
generality that
〈Aτ , F〉 = 〈A1
⊗
A2, F1 × F2〉
〈Bτ , F ∩ B〉 = 〈B1
⊗
B2, (F1 ∩ B1)× (F2 ∩ B2)〉
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for some 〈B1, F1〉 ⊆ 〈A1, F1〉 ∈ Mod≡(`eq) and 〈B2, F2〉 ⊆ 〈A2, F2〉 ∈ Mod≡(`pa). Since
a, c ∈ B = B1 × B2, there are a1, c1 ∈ B1 and a2, c2 ∈ B2 such that
a = 〈a1, a2〉 and c = 〈c1, c2〉.
Again from Proposition 6.1(ii) it follows that there are θ1 ∈ ConB1 and θ2 ∈ ConB2
compatible with F1 ∩ B1 and F2 ∩ B2, respectively, such that
ΩB(F ∩ B) = {〈〈p, q〉, 〈r, s〉〉 : 〈p, r〉 ∈ θ1 and 〈q, s〉 ∈ θ2}.
Together with the fact that 〈a, c〉 ∈ ΩB(F ∩ B), this yields
〈ai, ci〉 ∈ θi ⊆ ΩBi(Fi ∩ Bi), for every i = 1, 2. (28)
Since `eq is equivalential, we can apply Theorem 6.6 obtaining that Mod≡(`eq) is closed
under S. Together with 〈A1, F1〉 ∈ Mod≡(`eq), this implies 〈B1, F1 ∩ B1〉 ∈ Mod≡(`eq).
Now, recall from Theorem 3.1(ii) that Mod≡(`eq) = R(Mod(`eq)). As a consequence, the
congruence ΩB1(F1 ∩ B1) is the identity relation. Hence by (28) we get a1 = c1. Since
a 6= c, we conclude that a2 6= c2.
Now, from (28) and the fact that ΩB2(F2 ∩ B2) is compatible with F2 ∩ B2 it follows that
either a2, c2 ∈ F2 ∩ B2 or a2, c2 /∈ F2 ∩ B2. (29)
Since `pa is assertional and 〈A2, F2〉 ∈ Mod≡(`pa), we know that F2 is a singleton.
Together with a2 6= c2 and (29), this yields a2, c2 /∈ F2 ∩ B2. As a consequence, we obtain
〈a, c〉 /∈ F1 × F2 = F, establishing the claim.
Now, by (28) there is an interpretation τ of `eq ⊗ `pin into `. By Proposition 6.1(i) we
obtain without loss of generality that
〈Aτ , F〉 = 〈A1
⊗
A2, F1 × F2〉
〈Bτ , F ∩ B〉 = 〈B1
⊗
B2, (F1 ∩ B1)× (F2 ∩ B2)〉
for some 〈B1, F1〉 ⊆ 〈A1, F1〉 ∈ Mod≡(`eq) and 〈B2, F2〉 ⊆ 〈A2, F2〉 ∈ Mod≡(`pin).
Recall that the matrix 〈B, F ∩ B〉 is not reduced. Then there are different a, c ∈ B such
that 〈a, c〉 ∈ ΩB(F ∩ B). Since B = B1 × B2, there are a1, c1 ∈ B1 and a2, c2 ∈ B2 such that
a = 〈a1, a2〉 and c = 〈c1, c2〉.
As in the proof of the claim, we obtain a2 6= c2 and 〈a2, c2〉 ∈ ΩB2(F2 ∩ B2).
Now, let ϕ(x) be an injective theorem of `pin. Since 〈A2, F2〉 ∈ Mod≡(`pin) and a2 6= c2,
we have
ϕA2(a2) 6= ϕA1(a2) and ϕA2(a2), ϕA2(c2) ∈ F2. (30)
Let also >(x) be an arbitrary theorem of `eq. Since 〈A1, F1〉 ∈ Mod(`eq), we have
>A1(a1),>A1(c1) ∈ F1. (31)
Observe that the pair 〈>, ϕ〉 is a unary connective of `eq ⊗ `pld. Together with (30, 31),
this yields
〈>, ϕ〉B1
⊗
B2(a) = 〈>A1(a1), ϕA2(a2)〉 ∈ F1 × F2 = F
〈>, ϕ〉B1
⊗
B2(c) = 〈>A1(c1), ϕA2(c2)〉 ∈ F1 × F2 = F
and
〈>, ϕ〉B1
⊗
B2(a) 6= 〈>, ϕ〉B1
⊗
B2(c).
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Since B1
⊗
B2 = Bτ , we know that 〈>, ϕ〉B1
⊗
B2 is a term-function of B. Together with
the above displays and the fact that 〈a, c〉 ∈ ΩB(F ∩ B), this implies that ΩB(F ∩ B)
identifies two different elements of F, i.e. 〈>, ϕ〉B1 ⊗ B2(a) and 〈>, ϕ〉B1 ⊗ B2(c). But this
contradicts the claim. Hence we reached a contradiction, as desired. 
6.3. Order algebraizable logics. We denote by Order and Truth the Leibniz classes of
order algebraizable and truth-equational logics, respectively.
Theorem 6.8. The Leibniz class of order algebraizable logics is meet-reducible among logics with
theorems, and can be described as follows:
(Order ∨ Truth) ∩ Equiv.
Proof. First we set K := Order ∨ Truth. Observe that K and Equiv are Leibniz classes by
Theorems 3.7, 3.12, and 3.13. The fact that they comprise only logics with theorems is a
consequence of Propositions 2.6 and 3.15. Moreover, we have
Order ( K and Order ( Equiv. (32)
To prove this, recall that every order algebraizable logic is equivalential [32, Prop. 7.11(iii)].
In particular, this implies that Order ⊆ K∩ Equiv. The fact that the inclusion Order ⊆ K
is strict is an immediate consequence of the fact that so is the inclusion Equiv ⊆ K2 in the
proof of Theorem 6.7. On the other hand, the fact that Order ( Equiv is witnessed by the
existence of equivalential logics that are not order algebraizable [32, p. 267].
In the light of (32), it only remains to prove that K ∩ Equiv ⊆ Order. To this end,
consider a logic ` ∈ K∩ Equiv. Clearly, ` is equivalential and, therefore, there is a set of
formulas ∆(x, y) of ` such that for every 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`) and a, c ∈ A,
a = c⇐⇒ ∆A(a, c) ⊆ F. (33)
Moreover, since ` ∈ K, there are an order algebraizable logic `or, a truth-equational logic
`tr, and an interpretation τ of `or ⊗ `tr into `. Then there there are a set of formulas
∇(x, y) and a set of inequalities I(x) of `or such that for every 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`or),
(i) the relation 4AF on A defined for every a, c ∈ A by
a 4AF c⇐⇒ ∇(a, c)A ⊆ F
is a partial order; and
(ii) for every a ∈ A, a ∈ F if and only if 〈A,4AF 〉  I(a).
Finally, since `tr is truth-equational, there is a set of equations E(x) of `tr such that for
every 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`tr) and a ∈ A
a ∈ F ⇐⇒ A  E(a). (34)
Now, we choose a theorem > of `tr, and for every formula ϕ ∈ ∇(x, y) we consider
the following basic operations of `or ⊗ `tr, in which pii is the projection map on the i-th
coordinate:
ϕˆ(x, y) := 〈ϕ(x1, x2),>(x1)〉
x( y := 〈pi1(x1, x2),pi2(x1, x2)〉.
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Observe that for every L`or -algebra A1, L`tr -algebra A2, and elements 〈a1, a2〉, 〈c1, c2〉 ∈
A1 × A2, we have
ϕˆA1
⊗
A2(〈a1, a2〉, 〈c1, c2〉) = 〈ϕA1(a1, c1),>A2(a2)〉
〈a1, a2〉(A1
⊗
A2 〈c1, c2〉 = 〈a1, c2〉.
(35)
Then we define the following sets of formulas and inequalities of `:
∇∗(x, y) := {τ(ϕˆ) : ϕ ∈ ∇} ∪∆(x, τ(x( y))
I∗(x) := {τ(〈ε(x1), ζ(x1)〉) 4 τ(〈δ(x1),γ(x1)〉) : ε 4 δ ∈ I and ζ ≈ γ ∈ E}.
To conclude the proof, it will be enough to show that the sets ∇∗ and I∗ witness the
order algebraizability of `. To this end, consider a matrix 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`), and let 4AF
be the relation on A defined for every a, c ∈ A as
a 4AF c⇐⇒ ∇∗(a, c)A ⊆ F.
We need to show that 4AF is a partial order on A and that for every a ∈ A,
a ∈ F ⇐⇒ 〈A,4AF 〉  I∗(a). (36)
We claim that for every 〈a1, a2〉, 〈c1, c2〉 ∈ A1 × A2 = A,
〈a1, a2〉 4AF 〈c1, c2〉 ⇐⇒ a1 4A1F1 c1 and a2 = c2.
To prove this, observe that
〈a1, a2〉 4AF 〈c1, c2〉 ⇐⇒∇∗(〈a1, a2〉, 〈c1, c2〉)A ⊆ F
⇐⇒{τ(ϕˆ)A(〈a1, a2〉, 〈c1, c2〉) : ϕ ∈ ∇} ⊆ F and
∆A(〈a1, a2〉, τ(〈a1, a2〉( 〈c1, c2〉) ⊆ F
⇐⇒{ϕˆA1
⊗
A2(〈a1, a2〉, 〈c1, c2〉) : ϕ ∈ ∇} ⊆ F and
∆A(〈a1, a2〉, 〈a1, a2〉(A1
⊗
A2 〈c1, c2〉) ⊆ F
⇐⇒{〈ϕA1(a1, c1),>A2(a2)〉 : ϕ ∈ ∇} ⊆ F and
∆A(〈a1, a2〉, 〈a1, c2〉) ⊆ F
⇐⇒∇A1(a1, c1) ⊆ F1 and 〈a1, a2〉 = 〈a1, c2〉
⇐⇒ a1 4A1F1 c1 and a2 = c2.
The above equivalences are justified as follows: the first, the second, and the sixth are
straightforward, the third follows from the fact that Aτ = A1
⊗
A2, the fourth is a
consequence of (35), and the fifth follows from (33) and the observation that F = F1 × F2
and >A2(a2) ∈ F2. This establishes the claim.
Recall that 4A1F1 is a partial order on A1 by (i). Together with the claim, this implies
that 4AF is a partial order on A. Then consider an element 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ A1 × A2 = A. We
have
〈a1, a2〉 ∈ F ⇐⇒ a1 ∈ F1 and a2 ∈ F2
⇐⇒〈Aτ1 ,4A1F1 〉  I(a1) and Aτ2  E(a2)
⇐⇒〈A,4AF 〉  I∗(〈a1, a2〉).
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The above equivalences are justified as follows: the first is a consequence of the equality
F = F1 × F2, the second follows from (ii) and (34), and the third from the claim. This
establishes (36). Hence we conclude that ` is order algebraizable. 
6.4. Parametrically truth-equational logics. As we mentioned, parametrically truth-
equational logics need not have theorems in general [27, Sec. 4]. In particular, they lie
outside the scope of Proposition 4.3 and we cannot immediately infer that their Leibniz
class is meet-reducible in the absolute sense. We proceed to prove that this is indeed the
case. To this end, we need the following observation:
Proposition 6.9. Every parametrically truth-equational logic is truth-minimal, but the converse
does not hold in general.
Proof. Let ` be a parametrically truth-equational logic. Then consider two matrices
〈A, F〉, 〈A, G〉 ∈ Mod≡(`) such that ∅ 6= G ⊆ F. Let also E(x,~y) be the set of equations
that witnesses the fact that ` is parametrically truth-equational. Since 〈A, F〉, 〈A, G〉 ∈
Mod≡(`) and F, G 6= ∅, for every a ∈ A we have
a ∈ F ⇐⇒ A  E(a,~c) for every ~c ∈ A⇐⇒ a ∈ G.
As a consequence we obtain F = G and, therefore, that ` is truth-minimal. This
establishes that every parametrically truth-equational logic is truth-minimal.
To conclude the proof, we need to exhibit a truth-minimal logic that is not para-
metrically truth-equational. To this end, let ` be the logic formulated in countably
many variables induced by the set of matrices {〈B2, {1}〉, 〈B2, {0}〉}, where B2 is the
two-element Boolean algebra with universe {0, 1}. By Proposition 5.2 the logic ` is
truth-minimal. Now, since B2 is a two-element algebra, it is immediate that the matrices
〈B2, {1}〉 and 〈B2, {0}〉 are reduced. As a consequence, we obtain
〈B2, {1}〉, 〈B2, {0}〉 ∈ R(Mod(`)) ⊆ Mod≡(`).
Suppose, with a view to contradiction, that ` is parametrically truth-equational, and let
E(x,~y) be the set of equations witnessing this fact. We have
1 ∈ {1} =⇒ B2  E(1,~c), for every ~c ∈ B2
=⇒ 1 ∈ {0}
=⇒ 0 = 1.
The first implication above follows from the fact that 〈B2, {1}〉 ∈ Mod≡(`), the second
from 〈B2, {0}〉 ∈ Mod≡(`), and the third is straightforward. Since 0 6= 1, this produces a
contradiction. Hence we conclude that ` is not parametrically truth-equational. 
Given a logic ` and an L`-algebra A, we denote by Fi`A the set of deductive filters
of ` on A. We build on the following characterization result.
Theorem 6.10. A logic ` is parametrically truth-equational if and only if for every L`-algebra
A and every family X ∪ {F} ⊆ Fi`Ar {∅},
if
⋂{ΩAG : G ∈ X} ⊆ ΩAF, then ⋂X ⊆ F.
Proof. The result is essentially a re-working of an analogous characterization of truth-
equational logics in [31]. For the details, see [27, Thm. 3.9]. 
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We denote by Thrms, ParTruth, and Mnml the Leibniz classes of logics with theorems,
parametrically truth-equational logics, and truth-minimal logics respectively.
Theorem 6.11. The Leibniz class of parametrically truth-equational logics is meet-reducible, and
can be described as follows:
(Thrms∨ ParTruth) ∩Mnml.
Proof. First we set K := Thrms ∨ ParTruth, and observe that K and Mnml are Leibniz
classes by Theorems 3.12, 3.13, and 5.4. Moreover, we have
ParTruth ( K and ParTruth ( Mnml. (37)
The validity of the inclusion ParTruth ⊆ K is straightforward. The fact that it is strict
is witnessed by the existence of logics with theorems that are not parametrically truth-
equational, e.g. [27, Ex. 7.5]. On the other hand, from Proposition 6.9 it follows that
ParTruth ( Mnml.
In the light of (37), it only remains to prove that K ∩Mnml ⊆ ParTruth. To this end,
consider a logic ` ∈ K∩Mnml. Clearly, ` is truth-minimal, and there are a parametrically
truth-equational logic `pt, and a logic with theorems `thm such that `pt ⊗ `thm 6 `.
Then let τ be an interpretation of `pt ⊗ `thm into `.
In order to establish that ` is parametrically truth-equational, we rely on Theorem
6.10. Consider an L`-algebra on A, and a family X ∪ {F} ⊆ Fi`Ar {∅} such that⋂{ΩAG : G ∈ X} ⊆ ΩAF. (38)
To conclude the proof it suffices to show that
⋂
X ⊆ F. If ⋂X = ∅, we are done. Then we
consider the case where
⋂
X is non-empty. For the sake of readability, we set H :=
⋂
X
and θ :=
∼
ΩA`
⋂
X.
From the fact that 〈A/θ, H/θ〉 ∈ Mod≡(`) and [1, Prop. 4.12], it follows that
〈(A/θ)τ , H/θ〉 = 〈A1, H1〉
⊗〈A2, H2〉 (39)
for some 〈A1, H1〉 ∈ Mod≡(`pt) and 〈A2, H2〉 ∈ Mod≡(`thm) with H1, H2 6= ∅. Moreover,
by (38) we obtain
θ ⊆ ⋂{ΩAG : G ∈ X} ⊆ ΩAF.
As a consequence, θ is compatible with F and, therefore, F/θ ∈ Fi`(A/θ). Together with
the fact that τ is an interpretation of `pt ⊗ `thm into ` and [24, Prop. 3.3], this yields
F/θ ∈ Fi`pt⊗`thm((A/θ)τ) and F/θ 6= ∅.
With an application of Lemma 5.3 to the above display and (39), we conclude that
F/θ = F1 × F2 for some F1 ∈ Fi`ptA1r {∅}, and F2 ∈ Fi`thmA2. (40)
We claim that H/θ ∩ F/θ 6= ∅. To prove this, consider the family Y := {G ∈
Fi`ptA1 : H1 ⊆ G}. We have⋂{ΩA1 G : G ∈ Y} = ∼ΩA1`pt H1 ⊆ ΩA1 F1,
where the inclusion
∼
ΩA1`pt H1 ⊆ ΩA1 F1 follows from the fact that
∼
ΩA1`pt H1 is the identity
relation, because 〈A1, H1〉 ∈ Mod≡(`pt). Since Y ∪ {F1} ⊆ Fi`ptA1r {∅}, we apply the
fact that `pt is parametrically truth-equational and Theorem 6.10, obtaining H1 = ⋂Y ⊆
F1. In particular, this guarantees that H1 ∩ F1 6= ∅, since H1 6= ∅. Similarly, the fact that
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`thm has theorems and H2, F2 ∈ Fi`thmA2 implies H2 ∩ F2 6= ∅. Thus for every i = 1, 2
there is ai ∈ Hi ∩ Fi. By (39, 40) we conclude
〈a1, a2〉 ∈ (H1 × H2) ∩ (F1 × F2) = H/θ ∩ F/θ,
establishing the claim.
Now, observe that the intersection Z := H/θ ∩ F/θ is clearly a deductive filter of ` on
A/θ. Together with the fact that Z ⊆ H/θ, this implies ∼ΩA/θ` Z ⊆
∼
ΩA/θ` (H/θ). Since the
latter congruence is the identity, so is
∼
ΩA`Z and, therefore, 〈A/θ, Z〉 ∈ Mod≡(`). This
fact, together with the claim and Z ⊆ H/θ, implies
H/θ = Z = H/θ ∩ F/θ.
Since θ is compatible both with H and F, we conclude that
⋂
X = H ⊆ F. 
7. Meet-prime logics
Traditional abstract algebraic logic tends to attribute the status of fundamental concepts
both to protoalgebraic and equivalential logics. Unfortunately, this intuition does not
match the fact that, when regarded as Leibniz classes, protoalgebraic and equivalential
logics happen to be meet-reducible in the Leibniz hierarchy (Theorems 6.3 and 6.7). With
an eye towards softening this apparent incoherence, we shall explore a different sense in
which a Leibniz class can be considered to capture a primitive or fundamental concept.
Definition 7.1. A logic ` is meet-prime when J`K is meet-prime in Log.
A Leibniz class class can then also be considered primitive or fundamental when it is
induced by a Leibniz condition whose members are meet-prime logics. In this section we
show that this is indeed the case for protoalgebraic, equivalential, and assertional logics.5
It is convenient to start with the case of protoalgebraic logics. Recall that for every
infinite cardinal κ, the basic protoalgebraic logic of rank κ is denoted by `κP (Definition
3.2). Our aim is to prove the following:
Theorem 7.2. For every infinite cardinal κ > 0, the logic `κP is meet-prime.
As a consequence, we obtain the desired result.
Corollary 7.3. The class of protoalgebraic logics has the form Log(Φ) for some Leibniz condition
Φ consisting of meet-prime logics.
Proof. Immediate from Theorems 3.4 and 7.2. 
The proof of Theorem 7.2 proceeds through a series of technical observations. Given a
pair of infinite cardinals κ and ν, we let
{〈Aj, Fj〉 : j ∈ Jκν}
be the set of ν-generated matrices in Mod≡(`κP) up to isomorphism. We can assume
without loss of generality that the various algebras Aj have disjoint universes. Then let
5For a proof of the fact a range of well-known logics, including all extensions of intuitionistic logic, are
meet-irreducible, we refer the reader to [23].
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λκν := max{ω, |⋃j∈Jκν Aj|} and consider the sets
Aκν := {>,⊥} ∪ {pα : α < λ+κν} ∪
⋃
j∈Jκν
Aj
Fκν := {>} ∪ {pα : α < λ+κν} ∪
⋃
j∈Jκν
Fj
where ⊥,>, pα are new distinct elements. We endow Aκν with the structure of an
L κP -algebra Aκν stipulating that for every α < κ, 0 < n ∈ ω, and a, b, c1, . . . , cn ∈ Aκν,
a(Aκνα b :=

a(Ajα b if a, b ∈ Aj for some j ∈ Jκν
> if a = b and {a, b} * ⋃j∈Jκν Aj
⊥ if a 6= b and {a, b} * ⋃j∈Jκν Aj
and
∗Aκνnα (c1, . . . , cn) :=
{
∗Ajnα(c1, . . . , cn) if c1, . . . , cn ∈ Aj for some j ∈ Jκν
⊥ otherwise.
Observe that Aκν is well defined, since the various Aj have disjoint universes.
Fact 8. For every pair of infinite cardinals κ and ν, we have |Fκν| > |Aκν r Fκν|.
Proof. From the definition of Aκν and Fκν it follows that
|Fκν| > λ+κν > λκν = max{ω, |
⋃
j∈Jκν
Aj|} > |Aκν r Fκν|. 
Fact 9. For every pair of infinite cardinals κ and ν, and j ∈ Jκν,
〈Aκν, Fκν〉 ∈ Mod≡(`κP) and 〈Aj, Fj〉 ⊆ 〈Aκν, Fκν〉.
Proof. The fact that 〈Aj, Fj〉 ⊆ 〈Aκν, Fκν〉 is clear.
To establish that 〈Aκν, Fκν〉 ∈ Mod≡(`κP), it suffices to prove that the matrix 〈Aκν, Fκν〉
is a reduced model of `κP. The fact that it is reduced is justified as follows. Consider two
distinct elements a, b ∈ Aκν. We have to prove that 〈a, b〉 /∈ ΩAκνFκν. First we consider
the case where there is j ∈ Jκν such that a, b ∈ Aj. Since `κP is protoalgebraic and
〈Aj, Fj〉 ∈ Mod≡(`κP), we can apply Theorem 3.1(ii), obtaining that the matrix 〈Aj, Fj〉 is
reduced. In particular, we can assume without loss of generality that there is a unary
polynomial function p of Aj such that p(a) ∈ Fj and p(b) /∈ Fj [24, Prop. 2.2(i)]. Since
〈Aj, Fj〉 ⊆ 〈Aκν, Fκν〉, the map p is also a unary polynomial function of Aκν such that
p(a) ∈ Fκν and p(b) /∈ Fκν. As a consequence, 〈a, b〉 /∈ ΩAκνFκν by [24, Prop. 2.2(i)]. Then
we consider the case where the is no j ∈ Jκν such that a, b ∈ Aj. Choose an arbitrary
α < κ, and consider the unary polynomial function p(x) := x →Aκνα a of Aκν. Observe
that
p(b) = a(Aκνα b = ⊥ /∈ Fκν.
On the other hand, we shall see that p(a) ∈ Fκν. If a ∈ Aj for some j ∈ Jκν, then we have
p(a) = a(Aκνα a ∈ Fj ⊆ Fκν,
since 〈Aj, Fj〉 ∈ Mod(`κP) and ∅ `κP x(α x. Moreover, if a /∈
⋃
j∈Jκν Aj, then
p(a) = a(Aκνα a = > ∈ Fκν.
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Hence we conclude that p(a) ∈ Fκν. Together with the fact that p(b) /∈ Fκν and [24, Prop.
2.2(i)], this implies 〈a, b〉 /∈ ΩAκνFκν. We conclude that 〈Aκν, Fκν〉 is reduced.
It only remains to show that 〈Aκν, Fκν〉 ∈ Mod(`κP), i.e. that 〈Aκν, Fκν〉 is a model of
the rules ∅∆κ(x, x) and x,∆κ(x, y) y. We detail only the case of x,∆κ(x, y) y, since
the other one is similar. Consider a, b ∈ Aκν such that {a} ∪∆Aκν(a, b) ⊆ Fκν. First we
consider the case where b ∈ Aj for some j ∈ Jκν. Looking at the definition of Aκν, it is not
hard to see that the fact that b ∈ Aj and ∆Aκν(a, b) ⊆ Fκν implies a, b ∈ Aj. In particular,
this guarantees that ∆Aκν(a, b) = ∆Aj(a, b), whence ∆Aj(a, b) ⊆ Aj ∩ Fκν = Fj. Together
with the fact that 〈Aj, Fj〉 is a model of the rule x,∆κ(x, y) y, this yields b ∈ Fj ⊆ Fκν.
Then we consider the case where b /∈ ⋃j∈Jκν Aj. Again looking at the definition of Aκν, it
is not difficult to see that the fact that b /∈ ⋃j∈Jκν Aj and ∆Aκν(a, b) ⊆ Fκν implies a = b,
whence b = a ∈ Fκν. 
Fact 10. Let κ and ν be infinite cardinals, `1 and `2 logics, and τ an interpretation of
`1 ⊗ `2 into `κP. Then for every i = 1, 2 there is 〈Bi, Gi〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i) such that
〈Aτκν, Fκν〉 ∼= 〈B1
⊗
B2, G1 × G2〉.
Moreover, either 〈B1, G1〉 or 〈B2, G2〉 is trivial.
Proof. Since τ is an interpretation of `1 ⊗ `2 into `κP, we can apply Fact 9 obtaining〈Aτκν, Fκν〉 ∈ Mod≡(`1 ⊗ `2). By [24, Cor. 4.14] for every i = 1, 2 there is 〈Bi, Gi〉 ∈
Mod≡(`i) such that 〈Aτκν, Fκν〉 ∼= 〈B1
⊗
B2, G1 × G2〉. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume without loss of generality that
〈Aτκν, Fκν〉 = 〈B1
⊗
B2, G1 × G2〉. (41)
It only remains to prove that either 〈B1, G1〉 or 〈B2, G2〉 is trivial. Suppose the contrary,
with a view to contradiction. We have
|B1|+ |B2| 6 |(B1 × (B2r G2)) ∪ ((B1r G1)× B2)|
= |(B1 × B2)r (G1 × G2)|
= |Aκν r Fκν|.
The first inequality above follows from the fact that, by Lemma 5.5, Gi ( Bi for every
i = 1, 2. The second one is obvious, and the third one follows from (41).
Now, recall that |Aκν| > λ+κν > ω. Thus the set Aκν = B1 × B2 is infinite, whence so is
either B1 or B2. In particular, this implies |B1|+ |B2| = |B1 × B2| = |Aκν|. Together with
the above display, this yields
|Fκν| 6 |Aκν| 6 |Aκν r Fκν|.
But this is in contradiction with Fact 8. 
Proof of Theorem 7.2. Consider an infinite cardinal κ. Our aim is to show that the logic `κP
is meet-prime. To this end, consider two logics `1 and `2 with an interpretation τ of
`1 ⊗ `2 into `κP. Then let τ1 be the translation of L`1 into L κP defined for every n-ary∗ ∈ L`1 as
τ1(∗) := τ(〈∗(x1, . . . , xn), x1〉).
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The above definition is sound, since the pair 〈∗(x1, . . . , xn), x1〉 can be regarded as a
basic n-ary operation of `1 ⊗ `2. Let also τ2 be the translation of L`2 into L κP defined
analogously.
We claim that for every infinite cardinal ν, there is i = 1, 2 such that
〈Aτij , Fj〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i) for every j ∈ Jκν.
To prove this, consider an infinite cardinal ν. By Fact 10 we can assume without loss of
generality that
〈Aτκν, Fκν〉 = 〈A
⊗
1, F× {1}〉
for some 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`1). We shall prove that 〈Aτ1j , Fj〉 ∈ Mod≡(`1) for all j ∈ Jκν. To
this end, consider j ∈ Jκν. By Fact 9 we obtain 〈Aj, Fj〉 ⊆ 〈Aκν, Fκν〉, whence
〈Aτj , Fj〉 ⊆ 〈Aτκν, Fκν〉 = 〈A
⊗
1, F× {1}〉.
Thus there is B ⊆ A such that
〈Aτj , Fj〉 = 〈B
⊗
1, (F ∩ B)× {1}〉. (42)
Observe that
〈B, F ∩ B〉 ∈ Mod≡(`1). (43)
To prove this, observe that 〈B, F ∩ B〉 ∈ Mod(`1), since 〈B, F ∩ B〉 ⊆ 〈A, F〉 and 〈A, F〉 ∈
Mod(`1). Hence it only remains to show that ∼ΩB`1 F ∩ B is the identity relation. Consider
two distinct elements a, c ∈ B. Since 〈Aj, Fj〉 ∈ Mod≡(`κP) and τ is an interpretation of`1 ⊗ `2 into `κP, we have
〈B⊗ 1, (F ∩ B)× {1}〉 ∈ Mod≡(`1 ⊗ `2).
Since the elements 〈a, 1〉, 〈c, 1〉 ∈ B× {1} are distinct, we can apply [24, Prop. 2.2(ii)] to
the above display obtaining without loss of generality a set F ∩ B ⊆ G ⊆ B such that
G×{1} is a deductive filter of `1 ⊗ `2 on B⊗ 1, a pair 〈ϕ(x, y1, . . . , yn),ψ(x, y1, . . . , yn)〉
such that ϕ ∈ Fm(`1) and ψ ∈ Fm(`2), and elements b1, . . . , bn ∈ B such that
〈ϕ,ψ〉B
⊗
1(〈a, 1〉, 〈b1, 1〉, . . . , 〈bn, 1〉) ∈ G× {1}
〈ϕ,ψ〉B
⊗
1(〈c, 1〉, 〈b1, 1〉, . . . , 〈bn, 1〉) /∈ G× {1}.
In particular, we have
ϕB(a, b1, . . . , bn) ∈ G and ϕB(c, b1, . . . , bn) /∈ G.
Observe that G is a deductive filter of `1 on B by Lemma 5.3. Together with the fact
that F ∩ B ⊆ G and the above display, this allows us to apply [24, Prop. 2.2(ii)] yielding
〈a, c〉 /∈ ∼ΩB`1(F ∩ B). This concludes the proof that
∼
ΩB`1(F ∩ B) is the identity relation
and establishes (43).
Now, recall from (42) that Aj = B× {1}. Then let pi : Aj → B be the projection on the
first coordinate. The fact that pi a bijection between Aj and B such that pi[Fj] = F ∩ B and
Fj = pi−1[F ∩ B] is a direct consequence of (42). Moreover, it is easy to show that pi is a
homomorphism. Therefore, pi is an isomorphism from 〈Aτ1j , Fj〉 to 〈B, F ∩ B〉. Together
with (43) this yields 〈Aτ1j , Fj〉 ∈ Mod≡(`1), establishing the claim.
From the claim it follows that there is i = 1, 2 such that for every infinite cardinal ν there
is a cardinal µ > ν such that 〈Aτij , Fj〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i) for all j ∈ Jκµ. Bearing in mind that if ν
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and µ are infinite cardinals such that ν 6 µ, then {〈Aj, Fj〉 : j ∈ Jκν} ⊆ {〈Aj, Fj〉 : j ∈ Jκµ},
this yields 〈Aτij , Fj〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i) for every infinite cardinal ν and j ∈ Jκν. Hence we have
〈Aτi , F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i) for every 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`κP), whence τi is a translation of `i into`κP. We conclude that `i 6 `κP and, therefore, that `κP is a meet-prime logic. 
Recall that for every infinite cardinal κ > 0, the basic equivalential logic of rank κ is
denoted by `κF (Definition 3.5). An argument, similar to the one described above, yields
the following conclusion:
Theorem 7.4. For every infinite cardinal κ > 0, the logic `κE is meet-prime. As a consequence,
the class of equivalential logics has the form Log(Φ) for some Leibniz condition Φ consisting of
meet-prime logics.
Recall that the basic assertional logic is denoted by `A (Definition 3.9). We have the
following:
Theorem 7.5. The logic `A is meet-prime. As a consequence, the class of assertional logics has
the form Log(Φ) for a strong Leibniz condition Φ consisting of a meet-prime logic.
Proof. In the light to Theorem 3.11 it will be enough to show that `A is meet-prime. To this
end, consider two logics `1 and `2, and an interpretation τ of `1 ⊗ `2 into `A. Moreover,
let 2 be the two-element pointed set. By Proposition 3.10 we have 〈2, {>2∗}〉 ∈ Mod≡(`A),
whence 〈2τ , {>2∗}〉 ∈ Mod≡(`1
⊗ `2). Together with [24, Cor. 4.14], this implies that for
every i = 1, 2 there is 〈Ai, Fi〉 ∈ Mod≡(`i) such that 〈2τ , {>2∗}〉 = 〈A1
⊗
A2, F1 × F2〉.
Now, observe that A1 × A2 is a two-element set. As a consequence, either A1 or A2 is
a singleton. We can assume without loss of generality that so is A2. Together with the
fact that F2 6= ∅, this implies that 〈A2, F2〉 is the trivial matrix 〈1, {1}〉. Thus
〈2τ , {>2∗}〉 = 〈A1
⊗
1, F1 × {1}〉.
Consider the translation τ1 of L`1 into L`A defined as in the proof of Theorem 7.2.
We shall prove that τ1 is an interpretation of `1 into `A. Making use of the above
display, it is not hard to see that 〈2τ1 , {>2∗}〉 ∼= 〈A1, F1〉. Together with the fact that
〈A1, F1〉 ∈ Mod≡(`1), this yields 〈2τ1 , {>2∗}〉 ∈ Mod≡(`1). By [24, Lem. 2.3] we conclude
Psd(〈2τ1 , {>2∗}〉) ⊆ Mod≡(`1). (44)
To prove that τ1 is an interpretation, consider a matrix 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`A). By
Proposition 3.10 we know that A is a pointed set and F = {>A∗ }. In particular, this
easily implies 〈A, F〉 ∈ Psd(〈2, {>2∗}), whence 〈Aτ1 , F〉 ∈ Psd(〈2τ1 , {>2∗}〉). By (44) this
guarantees that 〈Aτ1 , F〉 ∈ Mod≡(`1). Hence we conclude that τ1 is an interpretation of
`1 into `A, whence `1 6 `A. This shows that `A is meet-prime, as desired. 
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